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ABSTRACT	
 
 Author:		Byrn	Rathgeber		Title:		Paradoxes	and	Fallacies	and	the	Probability	and	Statistics	Behind	Them		Supervising	Professors:	Professor	Michael	Starbird,	Dr.	Linda	Henderson	
 
 
 Probability	and	statistics	form	the	basis	for	many	of	the	decisions	that	we	make	on	a	daily	basis.	However,	as	often	as	we	weigh	the	probability	of	certain	events	or	consequences	occurring,	we	just	as	often	make	mistakes	in	our	logic.	In	this	thesis,	I	examine	popular	paradoxes	and	fallacies	and	seek	to	explain	the	mathematical	concepts	behind	them,	with	the	goal	of	providing	a	wider	audience	with	examples	of	common	contradictions	and	mistakes	in	logic	and	how	to	resolve	them.			I	began	by	exploring	various	well-known	paradoxes	and	fallacies	in	an	effort	to	discover	trends	in	misguided	judgment.	I	selected	nine	of	these	and	then	further	examined	how	they	came	about	and	how	experts	over	the	decades	have	aimed	to	solve	them.	By	researching	the	solutions,	I	found	that	there	were	overlapping	mathematical	concepts	behind	them.	I	delved	into	these	primary	mathematical	concepts	and	discovered	that	there	were	three	that	stood	out:	basic	and	conditional	probability,	expected	value	theory,	and	regression	to	the	mean.	I	then	sought	to	explain	these	three	concepts	in	a	way	that	would	provide	readers	with	the	tools	to	solve	the	paradoxes	in	this	thesis,	as	well	as	similar	paradoxes	and/or	fallacies	that	they	might	encounter	in	the	future.	Additionally,	I	discussed	real	world	applications	for	each	of	these	tools	in	an	effort	to	demonstrate	to	the	reader	how	they	might	incorporate	these	newly	acquired	tools	into	their	lives.	The	thesis	concludes	by	recommending	that	paradoxes	and	fallacies	be	included	in	a	college	curriculum,	since	increased	knowledge	of	them	can	contribute	to	better	decision-making.	
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5 
SECTION	I:	INTRODUCTION	
	
	 “That’s	All	Folks”				 Though	it	has	been	over	seventy	years	since	the	witty	rabbit	crunching	a	carrot	first	found	his	way	onto	the	television	screen,	the	closing	lines	and	Bugs	Bunny	himself	remain	iconic.1	The	wisecracking	character	ran	circles	around	most	of	his	opponents,	but	was	no	match	for	Cecil	Turtle.	Cecil	always	managed	to	outrace,	or	rather	out-trick,	Bugs,	even	if	just	by	a	hare.2		The	fable	of	the	tortoise	and	the	hare	has	been	analyzed	and	adapted	by	many,	including	the	famous	Greek	philosopher,	Zeno	of	Elea.	In	Zeno’s	version,	the	Greek	warrior	Achilles	and	a	tortoise	challenge	one	another	to	a	race.	Suppose	Achilles	can	run	1,000	yards	a	minute	and	the	tortoise	can	run	100	yards	a	minute.	Before	the	race,	Achilles	is	feeling	confident	and	decides	to	generously	give	the	tortoise	a	1,000	yard	head	start.	In	a	race	between	a	warrior	and	a	tortoise,	it	seems	that	the	warrior	would	be	the	obvious	winner.	However,	after	Achilles	makes	it	1,000	yards	in	the	race,	the	tortoise	is	still	100	yards	ahead	of	him,	so	will	Achilles	ever	catch	up?3	Zeno	would	say	‘slower	when	running	will	never	be	overtaken	by	the	quicker;	for	that	which	is	pursuing	must	first	reach	the	point	from	which	that	which	is	fleeing	started,	so	that	the	slower	must	necessarily	always	be	some	distance	ahead’4.	In	other	words,	luck	is	on	the	side	of	the	tortoise	because	in	order	to	go	a	yard,	Achilles	must	first	run	half	of	a	
                                                1	Katie	Nodjimbadem,	"What	Gives	Bugs	Bunny	His	Lasting	Power?,"	Smithsonian.com,	July	27,	2015.	(The	short	quote	from	this	source	is	also	included	in	the	conclusion.)	2	"Bugs	Bunny	-	Tortoise	Beats	Hare,"	Cartoonsonnet,	accessed	2017.	3		Edna	E.	Kramer,	The	Nature	and	Growth	of	Modern	Mathematics	(Greenwich,	CT:	Fawcett	Publications,	1970).	4	Rachel	Thomas,	"Mathematical	Mysteries:	Zeno's	Paradoxes,"	Mathematical	Mysteries:	Zeno's	Paradoxes,	December	1,	2000,	accessed	2017.	
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yard,	and	before	that,	a	quarter	of	a	yard,	and	before	that,	an	eighth	of	a	yard,	and	so	on	to	infinity.	This	series	of	infinitesimally	smaller	increments	of	position	is	known	as	a	geometric	series.	The	sum	of	this	geometric	series,	where	the	multiplier	is	less	than	one,	will	then	give	the	distance	Achilles	must	travel	to	catch	the	tortoise.	The	sum	of	such	a	sequence	can	be	found,	so	the	distance	Achilles	must	travel	will	be	finite,	and	if	the	distance	he	must	travel	is	finite,	then	there	is	a	point	at	which	Achilles	could	catch	up.	In	addition,	if	the	distance	is	finite,	then	the	time	it	will	take	him	to	travel	it	will	also	be	finite.	How	can	this	be	if	there	are	an	infinite	number	of	distances	Achilles	must	travel?	This	is	the	paradox.	Zeno	is	thought	to	have	produced	40	of	these	contradicting	and	quizzical	puzzles,	which	later	came	to	be	known	as	paradoxes.	Zeno’s	paradoxes,	in	particular,	led	to	the	further	questioning	and	exploration	of	the	concept	of	motion	and	whether	or	not	an	object	is	in	motion	or	simply	in	different	static	positions	over	time.		The	Achilles	and	tortoise	paradox	relies	on	the	fact	that	distance	and	therefore	time	may	be	infinitely	divisible	into	smaller	and	smaller	pieces.	Despite	the	necessity	of	this	assumption	in	the	paradox,	Zeno	later	proves	that	distance	and	time	are	not	infinitely	divisible.	Additionally,	through	the	arrow	paradox,	Zeno	proves	that	the	universe	itself	cannot	be	broken	into	finite,	indivisible	elements.	The	arrow	paradox	makes	the	argument	that	if	an	arrow	is	in	a	place	just	its	own	size,	then	it	must	be	at	rest.	However,	every	moment	that	the	arrow	is	flying	it	is	in	a	place	of	its	own	size.	Therefore,	by	this	logic,	when	an	arrow	is	flying,	it	must	be	at	rest.	This	is	a	contradiction	because	how	can	an	arrow	be	flying	if	it	is	at	rest?	Aristotle	offered	the	solution	that	time	is	not	composed	of	a	set	of	
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indivisible	instants	and	that	motion	and	rest	do	not	exist	in	an	instant.5	Together	these	paradoxes	contributed	to	the	Theory	of	Relativity	and	the	consideration	of	light	as	a	particle	and	as	a	wave.6			 Scientific	American	writer,	Martin	Gardner,	described	paradoxes	as	truths	that	cut	so	strongly	against	the	grain	of	common	sense	that	they	are	difficult	to	believe,	even	after	one	is	confronted	with	their	proofs.7	In	fact,	since	their	beginning,	paradoxes	have	arisen	from	contradicting	truths,	which	have	called	for	further	explanation	and	investigation	into	new	fields.	The	questions	that	they	have	left	unanswered	have	inspired	and	forced	many	to	challenge	what	they	know	to	be	true	and	to	seek	new	truths,	which	has	led	to	advancements	in	numerous	fields,	including	those	of	philosophy,	mathematics,	physics,	finance	and	more.	While	they	have	been	valuable	throughout	history	for	large	discoveries,	such	as	the	concept	of	light	as	a	particle	and	a	wave,	they	are	also	relevant	to	many	of	the	daily	decisions	that	the	average	person	may	face,	from	which	investment	to	make	to	the	interpretation	of	medical	test	results.	Gaining	a	better	understanding	of	paradoxes	and	fallacies	and	a	few	of	the	key	mathematical	concepts	that	lead	to	their	solutions	would	provide	even	those	with	no	quantitative	background	better	tools	for	making	decisions	and,	ideally,	encourage	them	to	make	more	successful	ones.			 In	order	to	find	a	way	to	help	people	make	better	decisions	through	the	understanding	of	several	mathematical	concepts,	this	thesis	will	begin	by	exploring	a	number	of	the	more	popular	paradoxes	and	fallacies.	The	stories	and	histories	behind	each	
                                                5	Marc	S.	Cohen,	"Zeno's	Paradox	of	the	Arrow,"	Zeno's	Paradox	of	the	Arrow,	2003,	accessed	2017.	6	Ibid.4.	7	Martin	Gardner,	Hexaflexagons	and	Other	Mathematical	Diversions:	The	First	Scientific	
American	Book	of	Puzzles	&	Games	(Chicago:	Univ.	of	Chicago	Press,	1989).	
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paradox	and	fallacy	will	ask	the	reader	to	notice	why	certain	situations	present	conflicting	solutions	and	to	note	that	there	may	be	common	errors	that	occur	in	reasoning.		After	discussing	the	stories	behind	nine	different	paradoxes	and	fallacies,	I	will	move	on	to	address	several	key	mathematical	concepts.	These	mathematical	concepts,	including	basic	and	conditional	probability,	expected	value	theory,	and	regression	to	the	mean	will	supply	a	person	with	the	background	for	understanding	how	to	solve	and	evaluate	certain	scenarios.	These	concepts	overlap	in	the	paradoxes	and	fallacies	that	are	discussed	in	this	paper,	but	are	also	particularly	prevalent	in	the	solutions	of	other	paradoxes	and	in	certain	real	world	circumstances.		The	final	chapter	of	this	thesis	will	cover	the	real	world	implications	of	paradoxes	and	fallacies.	A	careful	description	of	when	contradictions	and	errors	occur	in	a	real-life	setting	will	guide	a	reader	to	understand	when	and	how	they	may	be	able	to	utilize	the	mathematical	concepts	covered	in	the	previous	section.	The	concepts	can	be	valuable	if	people	find	themselves	on	a	game	show,	in	a	doctor’s	office,	discussing	sports,	or	buying	stocks.	Regardless	of	the	situation,	picking	up	a	few	important	mathematical	tools	should	give	individuals	the	ability	to	solve	certain	dilemmas	and	recognize	errors	in	judgment.	As	a	result,	these	individuals	may	then	be	able	to	make	more	rational	and	beneficial	decisions.								
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SECTION	II:	PARADOXES	AND	FALLACIES	
Basic	and	Conditional	Probability	Paradoxes	
The	Birthday	Paradox	Richard	von	Mises	was	an	Austrian-born	American	mathematician,	engineer,	and	positivist	philosopher	known	for	his	contributions	to	statistics	and	probability	theory.	At	the	beginning	of	his	career,	von	Mises	gave	the	first	German	university	course	on	aviation,	and	later	constructed	and	served	as	test-pilot	of	a	600-horsepower	airplane	for	the	Austrian	army.	However,	after	the	German	defeat	in	World	War	I	and	his	being	classified	as	Jewish	by	the	Nazi	government,	he	fled	Germany	and	eventually	landed	a	staff	position	at	Harvard	University	in	1939.	This	same	year	he	introduced	the	now	widely	discussed	“birthday	problem.”8	The	“birthday	problem”	has	since	gained	greater	popularity	and	has	been	discussed	by	notable	mathematicians,	columnists,	and	talk	show	hosts,	including	W.W.	Rouse	Ball9,	Martin	Gardner	in	his	1957	“Mathematical	Games”	column10,	and	Johnny	Carson	on	a	1980	episode	of	“The	Tonight	Show”.	11		 The	famous	“birthday	problem,”	or	birthday	paradox	as	it	is	often	referred	to,	asks	the	following	question	“how	many	people	are	needed	in	a	room	so	that	the	probability	that	there	are	at	least	two	people	whose	birthdays	are	the	same	day	is	roughly	half?”12	Before	taking	a	guess,	let	us	consider	a	few	necessary	assumptions.	First,	let	us	assume	that	each	
                                                8	The	Editors	of	Encyclopædia	Britannica,	"Richard	von	Mises,"	Encyclopædia	Britannica,	September	27,	2002,	accessed	2017.	9	W.	W.	Rouse.	Ball,	Mathematical	Recreations	and	Essays	(London:	Macmillan,	1959).	10	Martin	Gardner,	"Paradoxes	Dealing	with	Birthdays,	Playing	Cards,	Coins,	Crows,	and	Red-haired	Typists,"	Scientific	American,	April	1957.	11,	"The	Tonight	Show	with	Johnny	Carson."	CornellCast.	Accessed	2017.	12	 Edward	 B.	 Burger	 and	Michael	 P.	 Starbird,	The	Heart	 of	Mathematics:	 An	 Invitation	 to	
Effective	Thinking	(Hoboken,	NJ:	Wiley,	2013).	
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person	has	an	equal	chance	of	being	born	on	any	given	day.	In	other	words,	the	probability	that	someone	is	born	on	any	day,	such	as	October	8th,	is	1/365	since	there	are	365	days	in	a	year	and	a	person	has	an	equally	likely	chance	of	being	born	on	any	day.	This	leads	to	another	assumption;	suppose	that	we	do	not	have	leap	years,	so	there	are	always	365	days	in	a	year,	meaning	there	is	always	a	1/365	chance	of	being	born	on	any	given	day.			 After	assuming	that	there	is	an	equally	likely	chance	of	being	born	on	any	given	day	and	that	there	are	no	leap	years,	consider	what	you	would	anticipate	the	answer	to	be.	You	might	think	that	a	room	with	367	people	guarantees	that	there	are	at	least	two	people	in	the	room	with	the	same	birthday.	This	is	because	there	are	only	365	days	a	person	can	be	born	on,	so	there	cannot	be	367	different	birthdays,	and	therefore	at	least	two	must	overlap.	Then,	with	367	people	in	a	room,	you	think	in	order	to	make	sure	that	there	is	about	a	50%	chance	that	at	least	two	of	them	have	the	same	birthday;	you	need	to	put	about	half	of	367	people	in	a	room.	So,	you	would	divide	367	by	two	and	decide	you	would	need	about	183	people	in	the	room	for	there	to	be	about	a	50-50	chance	that	at	least	two	people	have	the	same	birthday.	While	this	seems	to	be	sound	logic,	in	reality,	only	23	people	are	needed	in	a	room	for	there	to	be	just	over	a	50%	chance	that	two	people	share	the	same	birthday.13		This	is	the	source	of	the	paradox,	and	its	unexpected	solution	will	be	explained	with	the	help	of	a	mathematical	concept	in	probability.		
The	Monty	Hall	Paradox	
Lets	Make	a	Deal	may	conjure	images	of	screaming	fans	in	gaudy	costumes,	but	the	game	show	and	its	original	host,	Monty	Hall,	led	to	a	well-known	paradox	that	has	continued	to	perplex	even	those	with	the	highest	of	IQs.		
                                                13	Ibid.	
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	 The	Monty	Hall	paradox,	loosely	based	on	the	game	show,	has	a	complicated	history.	Officially,	it	was	first	submitted	to	The	American	Statistician	in	1975	by	University	of	California,	Berkeley	professor	Steven	Selvin.	Later,	the	problem	was	in	an	article	in	the	
Journal	of	Economics	Perspective	by	Barry	Nalebuff	and	in	a	1989	issue	of	Bridge	Today	by	Phillip	Martin.	However,	it	was	not	until	a	controversial	Parade	Magazine	article	in	1990	that	the	paradox	rose	to	fame.	Marilyn	vos	Savant,	known	for	being	listed	in	the	Guinness	
Book	of	World	Records	for	having	the	“World’s	Highest	IQ”	and	for	establishing	the	“Ask	Marilyn”	column	in	Parade,14	responded	to	a	reader’s	questions	regarding	the	obscure	Monty	Hall	Problem.	In	her	column,	she	provided	a	solution	to	the	paradox	that	was	so	counterintuitive	that	it	resulted	in	her	receiving	over	10,000	letters,	many	written	by	scholars	and	Ph.Ds.,	proclaiming	“she	blew	it”	and	even	one	saying	there	was	“such	a	thing	as	female	logic.”	Through	challenging	people	to	complete	their	own	experiments,	she	eventually	convinced	56%	of	the	general	public	and	71%	from	academic	institutions	of	her	solution.15	Though	much	of	the	dispute	has	subsided,	the	paradox	and	its	baffling	solution,	after	the	havoc	they	wreaked	on	the	mathematics	and	statistics	community,	remain	infamous.				 The	paradox	is	as	follows.	Suppose	you	are	selected	as	a	player	on	a	game	show	and	the	host	places	you	in	front	of	three	doors.	Behind	two	of	the	doors	are	donkeys	and	behind	the	third	door	is	a	car.	The	host	then	asks	which	door	you	would	like	to	choose	and	you	select	one	of	the	three	doors.	After	you	select	a	door,	the	host,	who	knows	what	is	behind	all	three	doors,	opens	one	of	the	two	doors	you	did	not	choose	and	reveals	a	donkey.	You	
                                                14	Zachary	Crockett,"The	Time	Everyone	“Corrected”	the	World’s	Smartest	Woman,"	Priceonomics,	August	2016,	accessed	2017.	15	Marilyn	vos	Savant,"Game	Show	Problem,"	Marilynvossavant.com,	accessed	2017.	
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are	then	asked	if	you	would	like	to	keep	the	door	you	selected	or	switch	to	the	other	remaining	door.	Assuming	you	want	to	win	the	prize,	should	you	keep	the	door	you	first	selected,	switch,	or	does	it	matter?		 At	first	glance,	the	question	appears	to	be	rather	simple.	If	you	are	given	a	choice	of	three	doors	where	you	do	not	know	what	is	behind	them,	then	it	would	be	logical	to	assume	you	have	a	one	in	three	chance	of	picking	the	door	with	the	prize	behind	it.	When	the	host	reveals	a	donkey	behind	one	of	the	doors	you	did	not	choose,	it	then	seems	as	though	your	options	have	been	narrowed	to	two	and	you	should	have	a	1	in	2	chance	of	winning	with	either	door,	making	it	irrelevant	whether	you	choose	to	switch.	However,	this	is	where	the	problem	becomes	a	paradox	because	once	the	host	reveals	a	donkey	behind	a	door	you	did	not	choose,	the	odds	your	door	and	the	remaining	door	have	the	prize	behind	them	are	no	longer	the	same.	16	The	key	to	understanding	this	lies	in	the	concept	of	conditional	probability.			 No	matter	how	the	problem	is	considered,	who	is	providing	an	explanation,	or	the	way	that	the	conditional	probability	and	Bayes’	rule	are	manipulated,	the	solution	remains	just	as	counterintuitive,	but	always	the	same.	The	probability	of	winning	is	higher	if	you	choose	to	switch.			 While	the	Monty	Hall	Problem	was	first	presented	in	1975,	two	other	puzzles	that	were	particularly	similar	predated	it.	The	first	of	these	was	Joseph	Bertrand’s	1889	box	paradox.	In	Bertrand’s	scenario,	three	boxes	are	presented:	one	with	two	gold	coins,	one	with	two	silver	coins,	and	the	last	with	one	silver	and	one	gold	coin.	Suppose	a	participant	draws	one	gold	coin	from	a	box.	The	question	then	is	what	is	the	probability	that	the	other	
                                                16	Eric	W.	Weisstein,	"Monty	Hall	Problem,"	WolframMathWorld,	accessed	2017.	
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coin	in	that	box	is	gold.	The	answer	to	this	is	calculated	much	the	same	way	as	in	the	Monty	Hall	paradox	and	yields	the	same	result.	However,	unlike	vos	Savant,	Bertrand	was	celebrated	for	his	findings.	After	Bertrand,	came	Martin	Gardner’s	1959	paradox	entitled	the	Three	Prisoner’s	Problem.	Statistically,	the	scenario	is	identical	to	the	Monty	Hall	paradox	and	Bertrand’s	box	paradox.	In	his	solution,	Gardner	wisely	and	perhaps	presciently	acknowledged	“in	no	other	branch	of	mathematics	is	it	so	easy	for	experts	to	blunder	as	in	probability	theory.”	17		
Prosecutor’s	Fallacy		 The	Prosecutor’s	fallacy	has	plagued	the	court	system	likely	since	the	beginning	of	law	itself.	However,	it	was	William	Thompson	and	Edward	Schumann	who	put	a	name	to	it	in	their	1987	paper	entitled	“Interpretation	of	Statistical	Evidence	in	Criminal	Trials:	The	Prosecutor’s	Fallacy	and	the	Defense	Attorney’s	Fallacy.”18	The	paper	mentions	a	discussion	one	of	the	authors	had	with	a	Deputy	District	Attorney	about	incidence	rate	statistics.	The	experienced	prosecutor	was	of	the	belief	that	you	can	determine	the	probability	of	a	defendant’s	guilt	by	subtracting	the	incidence	rate	of	a	“matching”	characteristic	from	one.		In	other	words,	consider	a	trial	that	you	have	witnessed,	either	in	person	or	from	a	TV	show	such	as	Law	and	Order.	Suppose	the	prosecutor	who	is	trying	to	prove	that	the	defendant	is	guilty	receives	DNA	evidence,	likely	at	the	last	possible	second	if	you	are	indulging	in	a	crime	show.	A	lab	evaluated	the	blood	at	the	crime	scene	and	found	that	
                                                17	John	Tierney,	"Behind	Monty	Hall's	Doors:	Puzzle,	Debate	and	Answer?,"	The	New	York	Times,	July	20,	1991,	,	accessed	2017.	18	William	C.	Thompson	and	Edward	L.	Schumann,	"Interpretation	of	Statistical	Evidence	in	Criminal	Trials:	The	Prosecutor's	Fallacy	and	the	Defense	Attorney's	Fallacy,"	Law	
and	Human	Behavior	11,	no.	3	(1987):	doi:10.1007/bf01044641.	
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there	was	a	match	between	it	and	the	defendant’s	blood	sample.	However,	the	lab	also	reports	that	there	is	a	1/1000	probability	of	a	random	match;	this	is	referred	to	as	the	incidence	rate.	The	prosecutor	reasons	from	this	report	that	there	is	a	1/1000th,	or	0.1%	chance	that	the	DNA	came	from	someone	else	other	than	the	defendant,	so	there	must	be	a	99.9%	chance	that	the	defendant	is	the	perpetrator	and	is	guilty	since	one	minus	0.1%	is	99.9%.		This	reasoning	however	is	incorrect	because	it	bases	the	probability	of	guilt	entirely	on	one	piece	of	evidence	and	does	not	account	for	other	evidence	in	the	case.	In	addition,	it	makes	the	mistake	of	considering	the	probability	that	a	defendant	is	guilty	given	the	evidence,	instead	of	the	probability	of	some	evidence	given	the	defendant	is	guilty.	This	is	a	mistake	because	the	probability	that	the	defendant	is	guilty	given	the	evidence	requires	that	you	know	the	probability	that	a	defendant	is	guilty.	The	accused	is	either	guilty	or	not	and	there	is	not	a	random	probability	that	may	be	assigned	to	this.	This	would	only	be	relevant	if	the	defendant	was	selected	at	random	from	some	population	that	included	the	guilty	party.19		For	example,	suppose	you	are	the	defendant	and	you	robbed	a	bank.	You	could	not	roll	the	dice	and	come	up	with	a	random	probability	that	you	robbed	a	bank.	You	either	robbed	the	bank	or	did	not,	and	it	was	not	by	random	chance.	The	only	time	this	sort	of	scenario	would	apply	is	if	there	was	a	group	with	the	robber	in	it	and	an	officer	decided	to	randomly	arrest	a	member	of	the	group	and	call	them	the	robber.	Then,	the	odds	that	this	person	was	the	actual	robber	would	be	meaningful.		The	prosecutor’s	fallacy	represents	an	error	in	logic	that	occurs	when	conditional	probabilities	are	confused.	Conditional	probability	and	the	theorem	behind	it	will	be	
                                                19	Philip	B.	Stark,	"Probability:	Axioms	and	Fundaments,"	Statistics	at	UC	Berkeley,	accessed	2017.	
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explained	in	the	next	section.	This	will	then	lead	to	a	better	understanding	of	how	this	is	an	error	and,	later,	why	this	error	could	result	in	wrongful	convictions	in	the	courtroom.		
Base	Rate	Fallacy	Suppose	you	live	in	a	city	with	two	different	cab	companies.	One	of	the	companies	drives	blue	cabs	and	the	other	drives	green.	The	blue	company	is	more	successful	and	has	85%	of	the	cabs	in	the	city,	while	the	green	cab	company	operates	the	remaining	15%	of	the	cabs.	Unfortunately,	one	night	a	cab	was	involved	in	a	hit-and-run	accident.	You	witness	the	tragic	event	and	tell	police	that	you	are	sure	the	cab	was	green.	The	case	is	brought	to	court	and	you	are	tested	on	your	ability	to	distinguish	between	blue	and	green	cabs	during	nighttime	conditions.	After	being	tested,	it	is	discovered	that	you	were	able	to	identify	the	color	of	the	cab	correctly	about	80%	of	the	time,	but	were	guilty	of	confusing	it	with	the	other	color	20%	of	the	time.	What	are	the	odds	that	the	cab	in	the	accident	was	actually	green	as	you	claim?20		 While	you	find	yourself	upset	that	you	could	not	determine	the	color	of	the	cab	correctly	every	time	when	tested,	you	sit	down	to	consider	the	facts	and	come	to	the	conclusion	that	there	is	an	80%	chance	that	the	cab	in	the	accident	was	green.	However,	if	you	came	to	this	conclusion	then	you	exhibited	the	base	rate	fallacy,	which	is	the	fallacy	of	allowing	indicators	to	dominate	base	rates	in	your	probability	assessments.	The	base-rates	typically	come	in	the	form	of	background	data,	and	in	this	case,	are	85%	and	15%,	or	the	given	color	distribution	of	the	cabs	in	the	city.	They	can	be	used	to	show	the	true	prevalence	of	an	object,	event,	disease,	etc.	in	a	certain	population.	The	80%	and	20%	rates	
                                                20	Daniel	Kahneman	and	A.	Tversky,	"On	prediction	and	judgment,"	Oregon	Research	
Institute	Bulletin,1972.	
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of	your	color	detection,	on	the	other	hand,	represent	indicant	or	diagnostic	information.	This	type	of	information	tends	to	relate	to	the	specific	object	or	event	being	discussed,	such	as	the	hit-and-run	cab.	It	has	been	discovered	in	a	number	of	experiments	that	people	are	inclined	to	dismiss	the	base-rate	information	and	place	a	higher	value	on	the	diagnostic	information,	as	you	may	have	done	in	this	question	when	you	assumed	that	the	odds	are	80%	when	they	are	actually	41%.21	Among	those	who	have	warned	against	and	popularized	this	fallacy,	are	Meehl	and	Rosen.	Meehl	and	Rosen,	in	their	1955	paper,	wrote	about	the	dangers	of	psychologists	evaluating	patient’s	test	results	on	diagnostic	information	alone,	rather	than	taking	into	account	base-rates,	and	other	relevant	information,	such	as	costs	and	goals.	They	found	that	clinicians	were	no	less	confident	or	skeptical	when	a	patient’s	test	results	yielded	a	rare	result,	such	as	‘suicidal.’22	Although	the	base-rates	can	be	easily	dismissed,	it	is	clear	in	this	situation	how	they	can	have	an	important	impact.				
Simpson’s	Paradox	
		 Simpson’s	paradox	occurs	when	there	are	two	different	categorical	variables	that	when	considered	together	are	qualitatively	different	than	when	considered	apart.	The	history	of	the	Simpson’s	paradox	is	also	somewhat	of	a	paradox,	as	the	statistician	Edward	Simpson	did	not	discover	it	and	described	a	slightly	different	phenomenon	in	his	1951	paper	on	association	paradoxes,	and	yet	the	paradox	bears	his	name.	Association	paradoxes,	of	which	Simpson’s	paradox	is	one,	and	the	discovery	of	them,	can	be	attributed	
                                                21	Maya	Bar-Hillel,	"The	Base-Rate	Fallacy	in	Probability	Judgments,"	Acta	Psychologica	44,	no.	3	(1980):	,	doi:10.1016/0001-6918(80)90046-3.	22	Paul	E.	Meehl	and	Albert	Rosen,	"Antecedent	probability	and	the	efficiency	of	psychometric	signs,	patterns,	or	cutting	scores.,"	Psychological	Bulletin	52,	no.	3	(1955):	doi:10.1037/h0048070.	
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to	the	British	statistician	Karl	Peason.	In	1899,	Pearson	showed	that	marginal	and	partial	associations	between	continuous	variables	might	produce	different	results	and	lead	to	incorrect	correlations.	In	his	study,	Pearson	demonstrated	that	male	skulls	from	the	Paris	catacombs	had	a	0.09	correlation	in	their	lengths	and	breadths.	However,	the	length	and	breadth	of	the	female	skulls	produced	a	negative	0.04	correlation.	Then,	when	the	samples	were	combined,	the	joint	correlation	was	found	to	be	0.2.	From	this	Pearson	determined	that	skull	length	and	breadth	were	uncorrelated	for	males	and	females	separately	and	positively	correlated	for	males	and	females	jointly.	After	Pearson	identified	that	the	paradox	could	occur	with	continuous	variables,	George	Udny	Yule,	a	British	statistician,	reported	in	1903	that	the	same	paradox	could	occur	with	categorical	variables.23		 The	paradox	is	best	understood	through	an	example.	One	such	example	occurred	in	a	gender	discrimination	suit	against	the	University	of	California,	Berkeley.	Berkeley	had	8,442	male	applicants	and	4,351	female	applicants	for	graduate	school	in	the	fall	of	1973.	Of	the	male	applicants,	44%	were	admitted,	while	only	35%	of	the	female	applicants	were	admitted.	This	would	suggest	that	gender	discrimination	occurred.	However,	when	researchers	looked	more	closely	at	the	admission	statistics,	they	found	that	this	was	not	the	case.	In	fact,	it	was	quite	the	opposite	in	certain	departments.	This	suggests	a	paradox	because	how	could	there	be	a	higher	percentage	of	males	admitted	than	females	if	females	had	higher	admission	rates	than	males	in	numerous	departments?				
                                                23	Bruce	W.	Carlson,	"Simpson's	paradox,"	Encyclopædia	Britannica,	August	31,	2016,	accessed	2017.	
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Expected	Value	Theorem	Paradoxes		
Allais	Paradox		 Suppose	you	find	yourself	in	a	gambling	mood	and	decide	to	enter	a	casino	with	a	few	friends.	In	this	particular	casino,	you	are	given	the	choice	between	two	different	gambles.	The	first	is	gamble	A,	which	100%	guarantees	you	$100	because	this	is	a	very	generous	casino.	The	second	is	gamble	B,	which	is	a	bit	more	complicated.	Gamble	B	gives	you	a	10%	chance	of	winning	$500,	an	89%	chance	of	winning	$100,	and	a	1%	chance	of	receiving	nothing.24	Which	do	you	choose?	Gamble	A	has	the	benefit	of	no	risk,	but	gamble	B	gives	you	a	small	chance	of	receiving	a	higher	payout.	Your	immediate	thought	is	to	go	with	gamble	A	because	you	believe	you	cannot	beat	a	guaranteed	win.	After	successfully	deciding	on	your	first	gamble,	the	casino	decides	to	offer	you	yet	another	two	gambles	to	decide	between,	gamble	C	and	gamble	D.	Gamble	C	gives	you	an	11%	chance	of	receiving	$100	and	an	89%	chance	of	receiving	nothing.	On	the	other	hand,	gamble	D	gives	you	a	10%	chance	of	receiving	$500	and	a	90%	chance	of	receiving	nothing.25	You	become	a	bit	concerned	with	all	of	the	percentages,	but	notice	that	gamble	D	gives	you	only	a	1%	lower	chance	of	winning	but	has	a	much	higher	payout.	You	carefully	weigh	your	choices	and	then	decide	to	take	the	risk	and	go	with	gamble	D	since	it	has	the	possibility	of	a	much	higher	payout.		Before	officially	deciding	to	make	gamble	A	and	gamble	D,	you	decide	to	check	with	your	friends	who	already	have	their	winnings	to	learn	which	of	them	won	the	most	and	what	gambles	they	chose.	You	discover	that	the	majority	of	them,	whether	they	won	or	lost,	
                                                	25	"Allais	Paradox,"	Policonomics,	2012,	accessed	2017.		(Gamble	A,B,C,D	and	the	numbers	behind	them	all	come	from	this	source)			
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made	the	same	gambles	that	you	plan	to	make,	but	that	the	winner	chose	gamble	B	and	gamble	D.	You	think	maybe	this	was	just	luck,	but	should	you	switch	to	gamble	B?	According	to	expected	value	theory,	the	short	answer	is	yes;	you	should	choose	gamble	B	and	gamble	D.	The	theory	claims	that	people	make	decisions	by	picking	the	option	that	will	provide	the	highest	expected	value	to	them,	where	value	refers	to	a	monetary	amount.26	In	this	case,	the	numbers	reveal	quite	obviously	that	gamble	B	and	gamble	D	have	the	highest	expected	values.	You	considered	yourself	logical	and	know	that	the	majority	of	your	friends	made	the	same	decisions	you	did,	so	it	seems	unreasonable	that	this	theory	claims	gamble	B	has	a	higher	value	than	A.	How	can	winning	100%	of	the	time	not	be	the	best	gamble	to	make?	In	other	words,	why	would	the	average	and	reasonable	person	who	can	assign	value	to	decisions	make	a	decision	with	a	lower	value?		This	contradicting	notion	that	people	might	go	against	expected	value	theory,	despite	expected	value	theory	rationally	claiming	people	make	decisions	based	on	what	will	give	them	the	highest	expected	value	represents	a	paradox	known	as	the	Allais	paradox.		The	Allais	paradox	was	first	mentioned	in	a	1953	French	paper	entitled	“Le	Comportement	de	l’homme	rationnel	devant	le	risque:	critique	des	postulats	et	axiomes	de	l’école	américaine.”	The	paper	was	written	by	French	economist	and	physicist,	Maurice	Félix	Charles	Allais.	In	his	paper,	Allais	successfully	proved	that	the	Allais	paradox	failed	decision	theory	due	to	its	violation	of	expected	value	theory.	Expected	value	theory	may	succeed	in	situations	where	a	person	is	presented	with	risk	one	way	and	fail	in	situations	where	a	person	is	presented	with	risk	in	another.	The	theory	is	successful	when	people	are	
                                                26	Rachael	Briggs,	"Normative	Theories	of	Rational	Choice:	Expected	Utility,"	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	August	08,	2014,	accessed	2017,
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in	an	uncertain	environment	where	risk	is	abundant.	On	the	other	hand,	when	there	is	an	opportunity	for	a	certain	positive	outcome,	then	the	theory	fails	because	the	average	person	tends	to	favor	situations	with	no	risk.		The	idea	that	Allais	developed	about	people	performing	differently	in	uncertain	environments	also	served	as	a	key	factor	in	helping	Allais	prove	that	effectively	allocating	risk	may	lead	to	a	more	optimal	allocation	of	resources.	This	then	contributed	to	him	later	winning	the	Nobel	Prize	in	Economic	Sciences	for	his	work	with	the	theory	of	markets	and	his	studies	on	the	most	effective	methods	for	consuming	resources.	In	addition	to	winning	the	Nobel	Prize,	Allais	and	his	work	inspired	future	economists	and	psychologists,	including	Daniel	Kahneman,	to	delve	further	into	the	field	of	behavioral	economics.27		
St.	Petersburg	Paradox		 Another	paradox	that	explores	the	idea	of	expected	value	theory	is	that	of	the	St.	Petersburg	Paradox.	The	St.	Petersburg	paradox	was	first	discovered	by	Nicolaus	Bernoulli,	a	Swiss	eighteenth-century	mathematician.	However,	it	was	published	by	his	brother,	Daniel	Bernoulli,	in	the	St.	Petersburg	Academy	Proceedings	in	1738,28	which	is	what	gave	it	its	name.	The	paradox	can	best	be	understood	through	the	flipping	of	a	coin.			 Imagine	that	you	decide	to	go	back	to	the	casino	and	are	given	the	opportunity	to	play	the	St.	Petersburg	game.	You	are	given	a	fair	coin	and	told	to	flip	it	until	you	get	a	tails.	If	the	number	of	flips	that	it	takes	to	get	a	tail	is	equal	to	n,	then	n	flips	will	you	give	$2n	worth	of	prizes.	For	instance,	if	you	get	a	tail	on	the	first	flip,	then	you	would	win	$21=$2.	If	you	were	to	get	a	tail	on	the	second	flip,	then	you	would	win	$22=$4	and	so	on.	If	you	were	
                                                27	"Maurice	Allais,"	Policonomics,	2012,	accessed	2017	28	Robert	Martin,	"The	St.	Petersburg	Paradox,"	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	November	04,	1998,	accessed	2017.	
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to	keep	flipping	heads,	then	the	game	could	potentially	continue	on	into	infinity.	This	poses	a	problem	because	if	the	game	could	be	played	an	infinite	number	of	times,	then	the	prizes	could	also	grow	to	be	arbitrarily	large.		If	the	expected	value	theory	is	applied,	then	each	flip’s	expected	payoff	turns	out	to	be	$1.	If	the	game	is	played	infinitely,	then	there	is	a	chance	a	person	could	win	an	arbitrarily	large	sum	of	money.	Even	if	there	were	a	high	finite	entry	fee	for	playing	the	game,	it	would	still	be	worth	the	gambler	paying	it	because	they	have	the	chance	to	win	an	extremely	large	amount	of	money.	However,	it	does	not	seem	reasonable	that	someone	would	be	willing	to	pay	an	extraordinarily	high	entry	fee	for	such	a	game.	There	must	be	a	cutoff	point	where	a	person	no	longer	wishes	to	enter	into	such	a	game	because	the	price	to	play	it	is	too	high.	This	is	the	paradox	because	while	it	seems	logical	that	the	game	could	be	played	an	infinite	number	of	times	and	give	a	player	a	finite	but	exceedingly	large	number	of	dollars	despite	any	high	but	finite	entry	fee,	it	seems	irrational	that	a	person	would	play	the	game	no	matter	how	high	the	price.29		
Newcomb’s	Paradox	Suppose	you	are	walking	along	and	suddenly	run	into	a	Wise	being,	which	we	will	refer	to	as	W.	W	tells	you	that	it	has	placed	$1000	in	a	box	labeled	box	A.	Next,	W	explains	that	it	has	another	box,	box	B,	with	contents	of	either	$1	million	or	nothing.	W	then	tells	you	that	you	can	take	the	contents	of	box	B	only,	or	take	the	contents	of	both	A	and	B.	You	think	this	sounds	too	good	to	be	true	so	you	decide	to	figure	out	the	catch.	W	explains	that	if	an	algorithm	predicts	that	you	will	only	take	box	B,	then	box	B	will	contain	$1	million.	
                                                29	Ibid.	
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However,	if	the	algorithm	predicts	that	you	will	choose	box	A	and	box	B,	then	box	B	will	contain	nothing.		Since	W	uses	this	algorithm	and	he	is	a	wise	being,	you	can	assume	that	the	algorithm	never	fails.	It	will	make	its	prediction	and	then	you	will	make	your	choice.	However,	at	the	time	of	your	choice,	you	do	not	know	the	algorithm’s	prediction,	so	which	box	or	boxes	do	you	choose?	You	decide	to	consult	game	theory	before	making	your	choice.	However,	this	leads	you	astray,	because	you	come	up	with	two	rational	answers	that	contradict	each	other.	The	first	approach	states	that	W	has	designed	a	prediction	algorithm	whose	answer	will	always	match	what	you	choose	to	do.	By	this	logic,	if	you	choose	both	boxes,	then	you	will	always	receive	$1,000	since	W	knew	to	put	nothing	in	box	B.	Alternatively,	if	you	choose	only	box	B,	then	you	will	receive	$1	million	because	the	algorithm	will	have	accurately	predicted	that	you	would	only	choose	box	B.	In	this	approach,	you	should	then	always	choose	only	box	B.30			The	second	approach	states	that	you	should	take	both	boxes.	Your	choice	occurs	after	W	has	made	its	prediction	and	you	believe	that	you	have	free	will,	so	you	can	choose	whatever	choice	you	want	and	it	will	be	independent	from	the	prediction	W	made.	With	this	logic,	if	W	thought	you	would	take	boxes	A	and	B,	then	taking	both	is	guaranteed	to	give	you	$1,000.	This	is	because	while	W	would	have	put	nothing	in	box	B,	you	will	still	win	the	$1,000	in	box	A	no	matter	what.	However,	if	W	predicted	that	you	would	only	take	B,	then	taking	both	boxes	would	give	you	$1,001,000.	This	is	still	better	than	only	choosing	
                                                30	The	previous	description	of	the	paradox	and	the	approaches	used	to	solve	it	were	taken	from	the	following	source.		Gregory	Benford	and	David	Wolpert,	"What	Does	Newcomb's	Paradox	Teach	Us?,"	SSRN	
Electronic	Journal,	2010,	doi:10.2139/ssrn.1381295.	
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box	B	because	in	this	case,	if	you	only	chose	box	B,	then	you	would	receive	$1	million.	Therefore,	by	this	method,	you	should	always	take	both	boxes.	Since	both	of	these	answers	seem	logical	but	contradicting,	you	can	see	how	this	is	a	paradox.	It	is	referred	to	as	Newcomb’s	paradox	and	was	created	by	William	Newcomb	in	1960.31	Interestingly	enough,	Newcomb	never	published	the	paradox,	but	did	discuss	it	at	length	with	philosophers	and	physicists,	including	Robert	Nozick	and	Martin	Kruskal,	and	later	with	Scientific	American	columnist	Martin	Gardner.			Nozick	featured	the	paradox	in	his	1969	paper,	in	which	he	suggested,	“To	almost	everyone,	it	is	perfectly	clear	and	obvious	what	should	be	done.	The	difficulty	is	that	these	people	seem	to	divide	almost	evenly	on	the	problem,	with	large	numbers	thinking	the	opposite	half	is	just	being	silly.”32	In	addition,	he	discussed	how	the	two	accepted	principles	of	game	theory	appear	to	conflict.	The	expected	value	theorem	takes	into	account	the	probability	of	each	outcome	and	states	that	you	should	take	box	B	only.	On	the	other	hand,	the	dominance	principle	states	that	in	situations	where	one	strategy	is	always	better	than	the	other	strategies	no	matter	what	the	other	players	do,	then	you	should	pick	that	strategy.	In	Newcomb’s	paradox,	regardless	of	what	box	B	contains,	you	will	always	receive	$1,000	more	if	you	take	both	boxes	than	if	you	just	take	box	B.	Because	of	this,	the	dominance	principle	claims	that	you	should	always	take	both	boxes.	In	addition,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Nozick’s	approach	presumed	that	W’s	predictions	were	of	high	accuracy,	but	were	not	certain.	He	also	excluded	the	idea	of	backward	causation,	or	the	idea	that	for	predictions	made	in	the	present	to	be	perfectly	determined	by	events	in	the	future	
                                                31	Martin	Gardner,	"Reflections	on	Newcomb's	Problem:	a	Prediction	and	Free-Will	Dilemma,"	Scientific	American,	March	1974.	32	Robert	Nozick,	"Newcomb’s	Problem	and	Two	Principles	of	Choice,"	Essays	in	Honor	of	
Carl	G.	Hempel,	1969,	doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1466-2_7.	
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means	that	the	future	causes	past	events.33	This	eliminates	the	concept	of	time	travel,	which	was	discussed	by	Newcomb	in	a	paper	around	the	same	time	he	created	the	paradox.34	Along	with	Nozick,	Martin	Gardner	also	wrote	about	the	paradox.	In	his	long	running	“Mathematical	Games”	column	for	Scientific	American,	Gardner	presented	the	paradox	twice,	claiming	that	the	second	time	generated	more	mail	than	any	of	his	other	articles.35	Gardner,	as	Nozick	did,	discussed	the	paradox	at	length	with	Newcomb	and	offered	both	possible	solutions,	providing	arguments	for	each	course	of	action.	Further,	he	concluded	with	the	question	“Can	it	be	that	Newcomb's	paradox	validates	free	will	by	invalidating	the	possibility,	in	principle,	of	a	predictor	capable	of	guessing	a	person's	choice	between	two	equally	rational	actions	with	better	than	50	percent	accuracy?”36	After	contemplating	these	two	lines	of	reasoning,	let	us	consider	what	solution	Newcomb	believed	to	be	correct.	William	Benford,	an	author	of	“What	Does	Newcomb’s	Paradox	Teach	Us?”	worked	with	Newcomb	and	also	often	discussed	the	paradox	with	him.	Benford	claims	that	Newcomb	created	the	paradox	to	test	ideas,	but	believed	in	the	second	solution,	or	the	idea	that	you	should	just	take	box	B	because	why	fight	a	God-like	being?37		Regardless	of	which	you	would	choose,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	mathematical	approaches	to	both	solutions,	as	the	math	may	change	your	mind	once	again.			
	
                                                33	Ibid.		34	Ibid.	30.	35	Ibid.	36	Martin	Gardner,	"Free	Will	Revisited,	With	a	Mind-Bending	Prediction	Paradox	by	William	Newcomb,"Scientific	American,	July	1973.	37	Ibid.	30.	
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Regression	To	The	Mean	Much	of	statistics	came	to	be	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	centuries	as	a	result	of	the	study	of	heredity	and	scientists’	fascination	with	the	likelihood	of	certain	features	in	one	generation	being	passed	down	to	the	next.		In	the	1880’s,	Francis	Galton	led	a	heredity	study	on	the	adult	heights	of	parents	and	their	children	in	an	effort	to	discover	the	extent	to	which	height	is	inherited.	The	data	collected	was	similar	to	his	protégé,	Karl	Pearson,	which	showed	that	the	twenty	tallest	fathers	were	on	average	6.2	inches	taller	than	their	generation’s	average	height,	while	the	sons	were	on	average	only	2.8	inches	above	their	generation’s	average	height.	In	addition,	in	a	study	of	the	twenty	shortest	fathers,	the	fathers	were	on	average	6.9	inches	below	their	generation’s	average	height,	while	the	sons	were	only	about	3.3	inches	shorter	than	their	generation’s	average	height.	In	other	words,	the	sons	of	the	tallest	fathers	were	taller	than	average,	but	not	by	as	much	as	their	fathers	were	and	the	sons	of	the	shortest	fathers	were	shorter	than	average,	but	not	by	as	much	as	their	fathers	were.	Galton	called	this	effect	of	height	getting	closer	to	the	average	a	“regression	toward	mediocrity,”	where	mediocre	was	thought	of	as	average.38	Let	us	discuss	a	different	example	of	this	phenomenon.		Consider	the	last	sport	or	game	that	you	played.	Were	you	in	a	slump	or	were	you	lucky	enough	to	be	on	a	winning	streak?	If	you	found	yourself	in	either	of	the	extremes,	then	like	it	or	not,	it	probably	did	not	last	or	will	not	continue	the	next	time	you	play.	This	comes	as	a	result	of	the	regression	to	the	mean	phenomenon.			 The	regression	to	the	mean	phenomenon	occurs	when	an	extreme	outcome	is	followed	by	an	average	outcome	and	where	the	game	or	event	taking	place	is	governed,	at	
                                                38	Daniel	Kaplan,	Statistical	Modeling:	A	Fresh	Approach	(Lexington:	S.n.,	2013).	
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least	in	part,	by	chance.	The	problem	occurs	when	it	is	assumed	that	after	an	extreme	outcome	has	occurred,	a	change	has	taken	place	and	this	extreme	will	continue.39	In	other	words,	just	because	you	were	losing	does	not	mean	you	will	continue	to	lose,	and,	in	fact,	you	will	likely	go	back	to	playing	how	you	usually	do.	Similarly,	if	you	are	on	a	winning	streak,	then	this	does	not	mean	that	you	will	continue	winning,	but	likely	that	you	will	eventually	go	back	to	playing	how	you	were	previously.	While	it	may	be	reassuring	to	find	out	that	losing	a	few	rounds	of	a	game	does	not	mean	that	your	talent	has	diminished,	it	is	less	exciting	to	accept	that	your	winning	streak	may	not	be	due	to	your	increased	ability.			 The	same	holds	true	for	many	of	the	famous	athletes	that	grace	the	pages	of	our	magazines.	The	Sports	Illustrated	curse	has	become	infamous	as	those	who	have	dared	to	pose	for	the	popular	magazine	have	found	that	their	previous	game-winning	plays	and/or	seasons	have	quickly	transformed	into	losses	and	injuries	after	the	cover	featuring	them	hit	the	shelves.	[Insert	Heart	of	Math	info]	The	curse	has	supposedly	claimed	many	victims,	including	most	notably,	the	Boston	Red	Sox	and	Chicago	Cubs,	Tom	Brady,	and	Michael	Spinks.		In	October	of	2003,	the	Boston	Red	Sox	and	Chicago	Cubs	were	featured	on	the	cover	of	Sports	Illustrated	as	they	were	touted	to	win	their	respective	league’s	championship	series.	However,	as	luck	would	have	it,	New	York	Yankee,	Aaron	Boone,	made	a	walk-off	home	run	to	defeat	the	Sox,	and	the	Cubs	fell	to	the	Florida	Marlins.	In	the	case	of	New	England	Patriots’	quarterback,	Tom	Brady,	Sports	Illustrated	chose	the	player	to	be	on	the	cover	for	the	2008	NFL	season	preview.	In	the	photo,	Brady	is	seen	stretching	with	his	knee	exposed,	which	proved	to	be	ironic	when	during	week	one,	he	tore	his	ACL	
                                                39	David	M.	Lane,	"Regression	Toward	the	Mean,"	OnlineStatBook,	2016,	accessed	2017.	
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and	MCL	and	missed	the	entire	season.	Another	casualty	of	the	curse	was	boxer	Michael	Spinks.	Spinks	found	himself	on	the	cover	in	June	of	1988	just	before	his	fight	against	Mike	Tyson.	Despite	the	cover	containing	the	words	“Don’t	Count	Me	Out,”	it	only	took	91	seconds	for	Spinks	to	be	knocked	out	by	Tyson.40	Countless	others	seem	to	give	proof	to	this	legend	of	the	Sports	Illustrated	Curse,	but	in	reality,	the	athletes	and	their	fans	have	failed	to	consider	the	regression	to	the	mean	phenomenon	that	is	unavoidable.		The	curse	not	only	suggests	that	athletes	after	playing	extremely	well	and	experiencing	big	wins	will	likely	return	to	playing	at	their	average	level,	but	also	that	those	experiencing	big	wins	will	most	assuredly	later	be	afflicted	with	extreme	losses.	While	it	is	true	that	athletes	will	most	of	the	time	play	at	whatever	level	is	average	for	them	with	some	highs	and	some	lows,	it	is	not	true	to	assume	that	highs	must	be	followed	by	lows	or	vice	versa,	so	that	a	player	stays	playing	close	to	average.41	Consider	you	are	playing	a	game	of	darts	and	hit	a	bullseye.	Have	you	hit	a	bullseye	the	exact	same	number	of	times	that	you	have	thrown	a	dart	and	not	hit	the	board	at	all?	It	is	unlikely	and	you	would	not	expect	that	for	every	time	you	have	missed	the	board	you	will	hit	a	bullseye.	The	same	holds	true	for	athletes	at	the	top	of	their	game.	Curse	or	no	curse,	just	because	a	team	has	made	it	to	the	league’s	championship	series,	a	player	experienced	a	winning	streak	the	previous	season,	or	a	boxer	is	undefeated	in	their	professional	career,	does	not	mean	that	they	will	experience	their	greatest	win	or	suffer	an	incredible	loss	or	injury	or	series	of	losses	or	injuries.	Instead	a	star	athlete,	or	an	amateur	dart	player,	will	likely	play	close	to	how	they	usually	do.		
                                                40	Nicholas	Parco,	"A	Look	at	Victims	of	the	Sports	Illustrated	cover	jinx,"	NY	Daily	News,	March	23,	2016,	accessed	2017.	41	A.	G.	Barnett,	"Regression	to	the	mean:	what	it	is	and	how	to	deal	with	it,"	International	
Journal	of	Epidemiology	34,	no.	1	(2004):	doi:10.1093/ije/dyh299.	
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The	sophomore	slump	is	another	misunderstood	occurrence	similar	to	the	Sports	
Illustrated	curse.	Players	with	the	highest	batting	averages	in	their	first	year	more	often	than	not	experience	lower	averages	in	their	second	year.	Many	attribute	this	to	a	slump.	While	it	is	true	that	their	averages	are	often	lower,	this	is	not	primarily	due	to	their	decreased	ability,	but	because	of	the	regression	to	the	mean.	They	are	more	likely	to	play	closer	to	average	in	their	next	season,	since	baseball	is	based	not	only	on	ability	but	luck.	While	ability	may	be	a	controlled	element	that	is	relatively	static,	there	is	an	element	of	chance	or	luck	that	may	vary	from	game	to	game	and	season	to	season.			The	regression	to	the	mean	may	be	explained	mathematically	through	the	concept	of	the	bivariate	normal	distribution.	This	probability	distribution	takes	in	to	account	two	random	variables	and	their	means,	variances,	and	covariance.	The	math	behind	this	distribution	and	its	relation	to	the	regression	to	the	mean	phenomenon	will	be	explained	further.														
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SECTION	IV:	THE	MATHEMATICAL	CONCEPTS	BEHIND	THE	SOLUTIONS	
Basic	and	Conditional	Probability	
Basic	and	Conditional	Probability:	Axioms,	Rules,	and	Theorems	
	 Behind	solutions	to	many	of	the	paradoxes	and	fallacies	are	mathematical	concepts	in	probability	theory.	A	brief	description	of	the	basics	may	aide	in	the	understanding	of	both	the	paradoxes	and	fallacies	that	have	previously	been	discussed	and	those	one	might	run	into	in	a	real	world	setting.		Before	covering	the	more	challenging	concepts	in	probability,	it	is	first	vital	to	comprehend	a	few	of	the	rules	probability,	as	a	whole,	must	satisfy.	In	mathematics,	these	are	referred	to	as	axioms.	The	first	of	these	is	that	the	probability	of	every	event	occurring	must	be	greater	than	or	equal	to	zero.	In	other	words,	there	cannot	be	a	negative	chance	of	something	happening.	The	second	axiom	states	that	the	probability	of	the	entire	outcome	space	is	100%,	where	the	outcome	space	contains	every	possible	outcome.	Another	way	of	saying	this	would	be	if	you	flip	a	coin,	then	there	are	two	possible	outcomes	that	could	occur:	you	could	flip	a	heads	or	you	could	flip	a	tails.	Each	outcome	has	a	50%	chance	of	happening	and	there	are	two	possible	outcomes,	so	there	must	be	a	100%	chance	that	the	coin	will	land	on	heads	or	tails.	The	third	axiom	states	that	if	two	events	are	disjoint,	or	mutually	exclusive,	meaning	they	cannot	both	happen	at	once,	then	the	probability	that	either	of	the	events	occurs	is	the	sum	of	the	probabilities	that	each	occurs42.	In	other	words,	if	you	were	trying	to	find	the	probability	of	rolling	a	two	or	a	five	with	a	fair	die,	then	you	would	add	the	chance	of	rolling	a	six-sided	die	and	getting	a	two	(1/6)	to	the	probability	of	rolling	a	five	(1/6)	to	get	a	2/6	or	1/3	chance	of	rolling	either	a	two	or	a	five.		
                                                42	Technical	Definitions	of	Axioms	from	the	following	source:	Ibid.	19.	
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	 All	of	probability	builds	on	these	three	axioms,	and	one	consequence	of	them	that	will	serve	as	a	particularly	useful	tool	in	the	solving	of	several	of	the	paradoxes	is	the	complement	rule.	The	complement	rule	states	that	the	probability	that	an	event	occurs	is	always	equal	to	100%	minus	the	probability	that	the	event	does	not	occur.43	For	example,	if	there	is	a	bag	of	three	marbles	where	one	is	red,	one	is	blue,	and	one	is	green,	then	there	is	a	1/3	chance	of	drawing	a	red	marble.	The	probability	of	not	drawing	a	red	marble	is	the	sum	of	the	probabilities	of	the	other	outcomes,	so	the	probability	of	drawing	a	blue	(1/3)	plus	the	probability	of	drawing	a	green	(1/3),	which	is	2/3.	If	we	did	not	previously	know	the	probability	of	drawing	the	red	marble,	then	we	could	find	it	by	using	the	complement	rule.	The	rule	states	that	the	probability	of	drawing	the	red	marble	is	equal	to	(3/3,	or	100%,	or	1)	minus	the	probability	of	not	drawing	a	red	marble,	or	(2/3).	Then,	1-(2/3)=(1/3),	which	is	the	probability	of	drawing	a	red	marble.	In	certain	situations,	it	may	be	easier	to	first	find	the	probability	that	an	event	does	not	occur,	and	then	subtract	this	from	100%	to	find	the	probability	that	it	does	occur.				 Another	important	concept	in	probability	is	that	of	independence.	Independence	and	mutual	exclusivity	are	often	confused,	and	it	is	important	to	know	the	difference.	As	discussed	above,	mutually	exclusive	events	are	events	that	cannot	both	occur	in	the	same	trial,	so	if	you	know	that	event	B	happened,	then	it	implies	event	A	did	not	happen.	In	other	words,	if	you	flipped	a	coin	and	it	landed	on	heads,	then	you	know	that	the	coin	did	not	also	land	on	tails.	In	addition,	with	mutually	exclusive	events,	the	probability	of	event	A	or	event	B	happening	can	be	found	by	adding	their	individual	probabilities.	Independent	events	on	the	other	hand,	can	happen	in	the	same	trial,	except	if	at	least	one	of	them	has	a	probability	
                                                43	Ibid.		
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of	zero.	Independent	events	occur	when	learning	that	one	event	happened	does	not	give	you	any	information	about	whether	the	other	happened.44	For	instance,	if	a	round	of	a	game	requires	you	to	flip	a	coin	and	roll	a	die,	then	flipping	a	tails	does	not	reveal	what	number	you	will	get	when	you	roll	the	die.	Further,	the	probability	of	event	A	and	event	B	occurring	if	events	A	and	B	are	independent	can	be	found	by	multiplying	the	individual	probabilities.	This	means	that	the	probability	of	flipping	a	tails	(1/2)	AND	rolling	a	three	(1/6)	would	be	(1/2)*(1/6),	which	equals	1/12.			The	probability	of	A	or	B	where	A	and	B	are	independent	events	is	known	to	be	less	than	the	sum	of	the	individual	probabilities,	unless	at	least	one	of	the	events	has	zero	probability.	This	means	that	the	probability	of	flipping	a	tails	OR	of	rolling	a	three	would	be	less	than	(1/2)	+	(1/6),	or	2/3.		 Independence	plays	an	important	role	in	conditional	probability.	Conditional	probability	measures	the	probability	of	event	A	occurring	given	that	event	B	occurred.	If	the	two	events	are	independent,	then	the	probability	that	event	A	occurred	given	that	event	B	did	will	be	whatever	the	probability	of	event	A	occurring	is,	since	the	two	events	are	not	affected	by	one	another.	In	other	words,	the	probability	of	flipping	a	tails,	given	that	you	rolled	a	three,	is	not	impacted	by	the	number	that	you	rolled,	so	it	will	still	have	the	same	individual	probability	of	occurring,	which	is	½	since	you	have	a	one	in	two	chance	of	flipping	a	tails.	However,	if	the	two	events	are	not	independent,	then	the	conditional	probability	becomes	more	complicated	to	calculate.	For	example,	if	you	have	a	deck	of	cards,	then	the	probability	that	you	draw	a	card	in	a	certain	suit	is	13/52.	Suppose	that	you	draw	a	heart.	Then,	without	putting	this	card	back	in	the	deck,	if	you	draw	again,	then	the	probability	of	getting	another	heart	will	be	12/51	since	there	is	one	less	heart	and	one	less	
                                                44	Ibid.		
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card	in	the	deck.	This	represents	conditional	probability	since	the	probability	of	drawing	a	second	heart	is	impacted	by	whether	or	not	you	drew	a	heart	the	first	time.	In	cases	where	the	events	are	not	independent	and	the	results	are	a	bit	less	intuitive	than	the	previous	example	above,	then	Bayes’	Rule	is	used	to	find	the	conditional	probability.	Bayes’	rule	states	that	the	probability	that	event	B	occurs	given	that	A	occurred	is	equal	to	the	probability	that	event	A	and	B	occurred	divided	by	the	individual	probability	that	event	A	occurred.45	For	example,	suppose	80%	of	your	friends	live	in	Texas	and	60%	live	in	Texas	and	are	Longhorn	fans.	What	is	the	probability	that	your	friends	are	Longhorn	fans	given	that	they	live	in	Texas?	If	you	apply	Bayes’	rule,	then	you	would	take	the	number	of	friends	that	live	in	Texas	AND	are	Longhorn	fans	(60%)	and	divide	this	by	the	number	of	friends	that	live	in	Texas	(80%).	The	probability	that	your	friends	are	Longhorn	fans	given	that	they	live	in	Texas	is	then	60/80,	or	75%.				By	the	multiplication	rule,	Bayes’	theorem	may	also	be	rearranged	to	calculate	the	probability	that	event	A	and	event	B	occurred.	The	probability	that	event	A	and	event	B	occurred	is	equal	to	the	probability	that	event	A	occurred	multiplied	by	the	probability	that	event	B	occurred	given	that	A	occurred.46	For	example,	suppose	that	there	are	seven	marbles	in	a	bag.	Three	of	them	are	white	and	four	of	them	are	orange.	What	is	the	probability	that	you	first	drew	a	white	marble	and	draw	an	orange	marble	second?	If	you	apply	the	theorem,	then	the	probability	that	you	choose	a	white	marble	first	and	an	orange	marble	second	can	be	calculated	by	first	finding	the	probability	that	you	choose	a	white	marble	first.	This	is	equal	to	3/7	since	there	are	three	white	marbles	and	seven	total	marbles.	This	then	is	multiplied	by	the	probability	that	you	choose	an	orange	marble	
                                                45	Ibid.		46	Ibid.		
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second,	given	that	you	chose	a	white	marble	first.	This	is	equal	to	4/6	since	there	is	still	the	same	number	of	orange	marbles,	but	there	is	one	less	white	marble	and	therefore	one	less	marble	in	the	bag.	Thus,	the	probability	that	you	choose	a	white	marble	first	and	an	orange	marble	second	is	equal	to	(3/7)*(4/6),	which	is	12/42,	or	2/7.	Bayes’	Rule	and	its	different	forms	are	particularly	helpful	in	understanding	the	solutions	and	explanations	behind	many	of	the	paradoxes	and	fallacies	that	have	been	discussed.	
The	Birthday	Paradox	Solution	The	Birthday	paradox,	which	was	the	first	paradox	discussed,	asks	how	many	people	must	be	in	a	room	so	that	the	probability	that	there	are	at	least	two	people	whose	birthdays	are	the	same	day	is	roughly	one-half.	Many	of	the	probability	concepts	that	were	just	explained	will	be	useful	in	forming	the	solution	to	this	paradox.		Given	the	assumptions	made	previously,	it	is	first	necessary	to	find	the	probability	that	two	people	share	the	same	birthday.	In	other	words,	what	is	the	probability	that	the	second	person	chosen	has	the	same	birthday	as	the	first	person?	If	we	were	to	tackle	the	question	this	way,	then	we	would	first	consider	the	number	of	possible	pairs	of	dates	there	are	for	two	people.	If	there	are	365	possibilities	for	the	first	person	and	365	possibilities	for	the	second	person,	then	there	are	365*365=133,225	possible	pairs	of	birthdays.	However,	there	are	only	365	times	where	the	first	person	has	the	same	birthday	as	the	second	person,	so	the	odds	that	two	people	have	the	same	birthday	are	365/(365*365),	which	equals	1/365.		Instead	of	continuing	this	and	finding	the	probability	that	two	out	of	three	people	have	the	same	birthday,	then	two	out	of	four	people	have	the	same	birthday,	etc.,	it	may	be	easier	to	consider	finding	the	complement,	or	the	probability	that	two	people	do	not	have	
 
 
34 
the	same	birthday,	and	then	applying	the	complement	rule	to	find	the	probability	that	they	do.	Finding	the	probability	that	two	people	do	not	share	the	same	birthday	requires	that	we	consider	there	are,	as	before,	365*365	different	pairs	of	birthdays.	However,	this	time	it	is	key	to	think	about	how	many	of	these	possible	outcomes	have	a	pair	with	two	different	birthdays.	Since	there	are	365	possible	days	that	the	first	person’s	birthday	might	fall	on,	then	there	are	364	days	that	the	second	person’s	birthday	could	fall	on	and	still	have	a	different	birthday	from	the	first	person.	Therefore,	there	are	365*364=132,860	pairs	that	have	two	different	birthdays.	The	probability	of	two	people	having	different	birthdays	is	then	(365*364)/(365*365),	which	is	equal	to	364/365	or	0.9972…	When	the	complement	rule	is	applied	to	find	the	probability	that	two	people	have	the	same	birthday,	then	1-(364/365)=(1/365)	which	is	equal	to	0.00273.	Thus,	once	again	it	is	confirmed	by	a	different	method	that	there	is	a	1/365	chance	that	two	people	have	the	same	birthday.		Let	us	apply	this	second	method	to	a	room	with	a	few	more	people	in	it.	Suppose	there	are	three	people	in	a	room.	Then,	as	we	calculated	before,	we	must	first	find	the	number	of	possible	triples	of	dates	there	are	for	three	people.	If	there	are	365	possible	dates	for	the	first	person,	365	possible	dates	for	the	second	person,	and	365	possible	dates	for	the	third	person,	then	there	are	365*365*365=	48,627,125	possible	triples	of	dates.	After	this	we	have	to	find	the	number	of	dates	such	that	all	three	people	have	different	birthdays,	and	then	we	can	apply	the	complement	rule.	The	first	person	could	have	a	birthday	on	any	day,	so	they	have	365	different	possibilities.	The	second	person	could	have	a	birthday	on	any	day	of	the	year	other	than	the	date	of	the	first	person’s	birthday,	so	they	have	364	possibilities.	Then,	the	third	person	can	have	a	birthday	on	363	days	since	their	birthday	can	fall	on	any	day	other	than	the	first	person’s	birthday	and	second	person’s	
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birthday.	Thus,	there	are	365*364*363=48,228,180	possible	triple	dates	where	all	three	people	have	different	birthdays.	Therefore,	there	is	a	(365*364*363)/(365*365*365)	probability	that	all	three	people	have	different	birthdays.	We	can	then	apply	the	complement	rule	to	find	the	probability	that	the	opposite	is	true.	This	is	equal	to	1-(365*364*363)/(365*365*365)=	1-0.9917=	0.0082,	which	is	the	probability	that	at	least	two	of	the	three	people	have	the	same	birthday.		0.0082	is	not	equal	0.5,	which	is	the	probability	that	we	are	striving	for,	so	we	must	continue	to	add	people	to	the	room	until	we	reach	this	desired	probability.	While	0.0082	is	not	close	to	0.5,	it	is	quite	a	leap	from,	and	in	fact	almost	three	times	greater	than,	0.00273,	which	was	the	probability	that	two	people	in	a	room	have	the	same	birthday.	With	this	in	mind,	we	can	see	that	the	probability	increases	dramatically	with	only	one	person	added	to	the	room.	Because	of	this,	we	may	get	to	the	answer	faster	than	we	think.		In	order	to	speed	up	the	process,	suppose	we	increase	the	number	of	people	in	the	room	by	5	each	time.	Then,	the	following	table47	of	values	would	be	created.		
Number	of	People	in	The	Room	 Probability	of	at	least	two	sharing	the	
same	birthday	5	 0.027…	10	 0.116…	15	 0.252…	20	 0.411…	25	 0.568…	30	 0.706…	40	 0.891…	50	 0.970…	60	 0.994…	70	 0.9991…	80	 0.99991…	90	 0.999993…		
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From	this	table,	we	can	surmise	that	the	probability	reaches	just	over	0.5	in	a	room	with	between	20	and	25	people	in	it.	If	we	were	to	calculate	the	probabilities	of	21,22,23,	and	24	people	in	a	room,	then	we	would	discover	that	23	people	are	required	in	a	room	for	the	probability	to	reach	0.5.	In	addition,	the	table	shows	us	that	in	a	room	of	50	people	there	is	a	97%	chance,	and	that	in	a	room	of	90	people,	there	is	almost	a	100%	chance	that	two	people	share	the	same	birthday.		From	the	math	behind	this	paradox,	we	can	see	that	there	are	times	where	our	logic	fails	us.	This	may	be	particularly	true	in	cases	where	small	probabilities	play	a	key	role.	However,	with	a	careful	understanding	of	probability	and	the	ability	to	consider	the	complement,	or	opposite,	of	a	situation	we	may	be	able	to	easily	calculate	and	understand	solutions	to	problems	such	as	the	birthday	paradox.	If	all	else	fails	and	you	still	remain	unconvinced,	try	the	experiment	for	yourself.	If	you	find	yourself	in	rooms	with	fellow	students,	coworkers,	or	friends	in	varying	numbers,	then	see	if	they	will	volunteer	their	birthdays.	If	you	perform	it	enough	times,	you	will	end	up	with	the	same	result:	with	23	people	in	a	room,	there	is	a	better	than	even	chance	at	least	two	of	them	share	the	same	birthday.	48	
The	Monty	Hall	Paradox	Solution	The	Monty	Hall	paradox	requires	that	we	use	Bayes’	theorem,	as	well	as	the	complement	rule,	which	we	recently	employed	in	the	birthday	paradox.	First,	we	must	examine	the	different	scenarios	that	could	occur	after	picking	a	door	and	then	calculate	using	Bayes’	Rule	to	discover	which	door	would	have	a	better	probability	of	having	the	car.		
                                                48	 	 The	 explanation	 and	 table	 provided	 to	 explain	 the	 birthday	 paradox	 came	 from	 the	following	source:	Ibid.12.	
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Then,	we	may	use	the	complement	rule	to	determine	the	probability	of	winning	if	we	switch	doors,	which	will	then	tell	us	whether	or	not	we	should	switch	doors.			Suppose	the	player	chooses	door	1,	then	there	are	three	possible	cases	that	could	occur.	The	first	is	that	there	could	be	a	donkey	behind	door	1,	a	donkey	behind	door	2,	and	a	car	behind	door	three,	and	so	the	host	will	then	open	door	2.	The	second	case	is	that	door	1	could	have	a	donkey	behind	it,	door	two	could	have	the	car,	and	door	3	could	contain	the	donkey,	and	the	host	would	then	open	door	3.	The	final	case	occurs	when	door	1	has	the	prize	behind	it,	and	therefore	doors	2	and	3	have	donkeys	behind	them,	meaning	the	host	may	open	either	of	these	doors.	If	you	choose	not	to	switch	doors,	then	you	want	the	final	case,	where	you	chose	the	correct	door	initially.	With	this	in	mind,	then	you	want	to	calculate	the	conditional	probability	that	the	last	scenario	occurs	given	that	the	host	opens	door	2	or	door	3.	If	the	host	opens	door	three,	then	door	one,	your	door,	and	door	two	are	left.	It	is	important	to	note	that	because	the	prize	must	be	behind	one	of	these	two	doors,	the	probabilities	of	the	two	doors	having	the	prize	must	sum	to	100%.	Below	is	a	list	of	the	cases.		
Using	Bayes’	Rule,	the	conditional	probability	that	the	third	case	occurs	(event	B)	given	that	the	host	opens	door	3	(event	A)	may	be	found	by	dividing	the	probability	that	case	3	happens	and	door	3	is	opened	(event	A	and	B)	by	the	overall	probability	that	door	three	is	opened	by	the	host	(event	A).	From	the	list	of	cases,	door	3	is	opened	in	case	2	and	in	case	3,	so	to	calculate	door	3’s	overall	probability	of	being	opened,	its	probability	in	each	of	these	cases	must	be	found	and	then	summed.	The	probability	of	case	2	and	door	3	
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opening	is	equal	to	1/3	since	there	is	a	1	in	3	chance	of	case	2	happening.	The	probability	of	case	3	and	door	3	opening	is	equal	to	the	probability	of	case	3	multiplied	by	the	conditional	probability	of	door	3	opening	given	case	3	occurs.	This	is	a	modified	version	of	Bayes’	Rule	that	occurs	when	the	multiplication	rule	is	applied.	This	is	equal	to	1/3	since	there	is	a	1	in	3	chance	of	case	three	occurring	multiplied	by	1/2,	since	in	case	3,	the	odds	door	3	and	door	2	are	chosen	by	the	host	are	equal	because	they	both	have	donkeys.	This	is	then	equal	to	1/6,	which	can	then	be	inserted	into	the	original	conditional	probability	equation.	The	probability	of	case	3	and	door	3	opening	is	then	1/6	divided	by	the	probability	of	door	3	opening	in	any	of	the	cases,	which	is	(1/6	+	1/3).	This	gives	the	probability	that	door	1,	and	therefore	any	door	that	you	choose	arbitrarily	at	the	beginning	of	the	game	show,	has	a	1/3	chance	of	having	the	car	behind	it	assuming	you	do	not	switch.	However,	because	the	probabilities	of	door	1	and	door	2	must	sum	to	1	since	there	is	a	100%	chance	the	car	is	behind	one	of	these	two	doors,	then	the	probability	of	door	2,	or	the	door	you	did	not	choose	and	the	host	did	not	open,	will	always	have	a	2/3	chance	of	winning.	This	means	door	2	has	consistently	better	odds	than	door	1	in	the	third	case,	and	that	you	should	
always	switch	doors	from	the	one	you	originally	chose.	An	explanation	of	these	calculations	can	be	seen	below.49	Note	that	“Pr”	refers	to	the	probability	of	the	event	in	parentheses.	The	line	separating	the	events	is	the	symbol	for	“given.”	The	comma	is	then	meant	to	represent	“and.”	
                                                49	"Conditional	Probability,	The	Monty	Hall	Problem,"	Conditional	Probability,	2008,	accessed	2017.
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	An	alternate	way	to	think	about	this	is	that	the	only	way	for	the	player	to	lose,	given	that	they	always	switch	is	if	they	choose	the	correct	door	initially.	There	is	a	1/3	chance	of	the	player	choosing	the	right	door	initially,	and	therefore	a	1/3	chance	of	them	losing	given	that	they	always	switch	doors.	Thus,	there	must	be	a	2/3	chance	of	winning	given	that	they	always	switch	since	the	probabilities	of	each	action	must	add	to	1.50		
Prosecutor’s	Fallacy:	Explanation	of	Error	
	 Bayes’	rule	as	we	have	seen	can	be	used	to	solve	several	paradoxes	and	fallacies.	Among	these	is	the	Prosecutor’s	Fallacy.			 As	previously	mentioned,	Bayes’	Rule	states	that	the	probability	that	event	B	occurs	given	that	A	occurred,	or	Pr	(B	|	A),	is	equal	to	the	probability	that	event	A	and	B	occurred	divided	by	the	individual	probability	that	event	A	occurred.		
Pr 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴) = Pr (𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵)Pr (𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵) 	
                                                50	Sal	Kahn.	"The	Monty	Hall	Problem."	Khan	Academy.	Accessed	2017.	
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The	Prosecutor’s	fallacy	occurs	when	the	probability	that	event	B	occurs	given	that	A	occurred,	Pr(B|A),	is	confused	with	the	probability	that	event	A	occurs	given	that	B	occurred,	Pr	(A|B).51			 	As	discussed	in	the	description	of	the	prosecutor’s	fallacy,	suppose	you	are	watching	a	trial	where	the	prosecutor	receives	DNA	evidence	from	a	lab.	Assume	the	lab	finds	a	match	between	the	defendant	and	the	blood	sample	found	at	the	crime	scene.	However,	the	lab	also	states	that	there	is	a	1/1000	chance	of	a	random	match	occurring.	The	prosecutor	makes	the	mistake	of	assuming	that	there	is	therefore	a	1/1000th,	or	0.1%	chance	that	the	defendant	is	innocent	and	a	victim	of	a	random	match.	By	this	logic,	there	must	be	a	99.9%	chance	that	he	or	she	is	guilty.	Let	us	apply	Bayes’	theorem	to	show	the	error.			 Let	H	be	our	hypothesis	about	whether	the	defendant	is	guilty	or	not	guilty	and	E	be	a	piece	of	evidence.	Our	goal	is	to	find	out	the	probability	that	our	hypothesis	is	correct,	whatever	it	may	be,	given	the	evidence,	or	Pr(H|E).	Applying	Bayes’	rule,	Pr(H|E)=Pr(H	and	E)/Pr(E).		However,	we	do	not	have	Pr(H	and	E),	or	the	probability	that	our	hypothesis	is	correct	and	there	is	evidence,	so	we	must	set	up	another	equation	to	find	Pr(H	and	E)	or	something	that	we	can	substitute	for	it.		Consider	Pr	(E|	H)=	Pr(H	and	E)/Pr(H).	By	the	multiplication	rule,	we	can	see	that	Pr(H	and	E)	=	Pr(E|H)*Pr(H).	Thus,	we	can	substitute	this	in	for	Pr(H	and	E)	in	our	original	formula.		So,	now	we	have	the	Pr(H|E)=Pr(E|H)*Pr(H)/Pr(E).		
                                                51	Ibid.19.		
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Now,	we	must	consider	the	overall	probability	of	the	evidence.	There	is	the	probability	of	our	hypothesis	being	correct	and	having	evidence,	as	we	just	considered.	However,	there	is	also	the	probability	of	our	hypothesis	being	incorrect	and	having	evidence.	Thus,	the	overall	probability	of	evidence	is	equal	to	the	probability	of	a	correct	hypothesis	and	evidence	plus	the	probability	of	an	incorrect	hypothesis	and	evidence.	As	we	calculated	previously,	the	probability	of	the	correct	hypothesis	and	evidence	is	equal	to	Pr(E|H)*Pr(H).	The	probability	of	the	incorrect	hypothesis	and	evidence	is	then	equal	to	Pr(E|	not	H)*Pr(not	H).	Thus,	Pr(E)=	Pr(H	and	E)	+	Pr(not	H	and	E)=Pr(E|H)*Pr(H)+Pr(E|	not	H)*Pr(not	H).		If	these	are	combined,	then	the	formula	is	Pr(H|E)=Pr(H	and	E)/Pr(E)=	Pr(E|H)*Pr(H)/	[Pr(E|H)*Pr(H)+	Pr(E|	not	H)*Pr(not	H)].	Once	we	have	the	formula	in	the	correct	form,	we	can	begin	to	consider	what	numbers	we	can	plug	in.		Assuming	we	believe	someone	is	innocent	until	proven	guilty	and	therefore	that	the	defendant	is	as	likely	as	anyone	else	to	have	committed	the	crime	on	the	island	before	evidence	is	considered,	the	probability	of	our	hypothesis	is	1/10,000	since	there	are	10,000	people	on	the	island.	Then,	we	can	apply	the	complement	rule	to	find	the	probability	of	not	H,	which	is	1-(1/10,000).	The	Pr(E|H)	is	the	probability	of	the	evidence	given	the	correct	hypothesis,	which	is	the	same	as	the	probability	of	correctly	matching	a	DNA	trace,	which	is	equal	to	1,	since	there	is	no	chance	of	a	false	negative	DNA	match.	The	Pr(E|	not	H)	is	equal	to	the	probability	of	a	match	in	a	person	who	did	not	have	DNA	at	the	crime	scene,	or	the	random	DNA	match	probability,	1/1000	as	the	lab	claims.				
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If	we	put	these	probability	values	into	the	formula	then,		Pr(H|E)=	(Pr(E|H)=1)*(Pr(H)=1/10,000)/[	(Pr(E|H)=1)*(Pr(H)=1/10,000)+	(Pr(E|	not	H)	=1/1,000)*Pr(not	H)=1-(1/10,000)]=	(1/10,000)/[(1/10,000)	+	(1/1,000)*(1-(1/10,000))]=0.090917…..,	or	about	9%.	The	probability	of	getting	the	correct	hypothesis	given	the	evidence	is	then	equal	to	about	9%.	In	other	words,	the	probability	that	we	believe	the	crime	scene	DNA	came	from	the	defendant	is	then	9%	and	the	probability	that	we	believe	the	defendant	did	not	have	their	DNA	at	the	scene	is	then	100%-9%=	91%.	52	91%,	or	the	Pr(not	H|E),	is	therefore	very	different	from	1/1,000=0.1%,	or	Pr(E|	not	H).	Prosecutor’s	fallacy	occurs	when	a	prosecutor	observes	the	DNA	statistics	and	assumes	that	the	probability	that	the	defendant	was	not	the	source	of	the	evidence	is	0.1%,	when	in	actuality	it	is	91%.	If	the	prosecutor	assumes	both	are	0.1%,	then	they	may	ascertain	that	the	defendant	has	a	99.9%	chance	of	being	guilty,	when	it	is	closer	to	9%	if	this	is	the	only	evidence	presented.	It	is	easy	to	see	how	this	big	of	a	difference	can	lead	to	much	higher	assignments	of	guilt	and	as	a	result,	wrongful	convictions.		
Base	Rate	Fallacy:	Explanation	of	Error		 The	Base	Rate	Fallacy	involves	an	error	in	the	calculation	of	Bayes’	Rule.	It	occurs	when	the	probability	of	an	event	A	or	the	probability	of	an	event	B	are	ignored	in	the	calculation	of	Pr(A|B)	and	Pr(A|	not	B).	This	can	be	seen	if	we	review	the	cab	example.	In	the	example,	the	blue	cab	company	owned	85%	of	the	cabs	in	the	city	and	the	green	cab	
                                                52	This	scenario	and	the	data	behind	it	was	adapted	from	the	following	source.		Norman	Fenton,	Martin	Neil,	and	Daniel	Berger.	"Bayes	and	the	Law."	Annual	Review	of	
Statistics	and	Its	Application	3,	no.	1	(2016):	51-77.	doi:10.1146/annurev-statistics-041715-033428.	
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company	owned	15%	of	the	cabs.	In	addition,	you	were	the	witness	to	a	hit-and-run	accident	where	you	claimed	that	the	cab	involved	was	green.	You	were	then	tested	and	it	was	found	you	could	see	the	color	of	the	cab	correctly	80%	of	the	time	and	incorrectly	20%	of	the	time.	Because	of	your	ability	to	see	the	correct	cab	color	80%	of	the	time,	you	assumed	that	the	probability	that	the	cab	was	green	was	80%.	However,	as	the	name	of	this	fallacy	suggest,	this	ignores	the	base-rate,	which	in	this	case	is	the	percentage	of	green	cabs	in	the	city.	In	order	to	arrive	at	the	correct	answer	of	41%,	we	must	take	into	account	both	the	percentages	of	the	blue	cabs	and	the	percentages	of	the	green	cabs	and	your	ability	to	spot	the	correct	color	cab	in	the	dark.	Bayes’	theorem	allows	us	to	do	this.	The	Pr(Cab	is	green|	you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green),	or	the	probability	that	the	cab	is	green	given	you	identified	the	color	as	green,	will	give	us	the	chances	that	the	cab	involved	in	the	hit-and-run	was	actually	green.	When	we	apply	the	multiplication	rule	and	Bayes’	theorem,	we	can	find	that	this	is	equal	to	the	Pr(you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green	given	it	was	green)*Pr(the	cab	is	green)/[	Pr(you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green	given	it	was	green)*Pr(the	cab	is	green)+	Pr(you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green	given	the	cab	was	blue)*Pr(the	cab	is	blue).	In	other	words,	you	are	finding	the	probability	that	the	cab	is	green	and	you	saw	it	as	green	divided	by	the	overall	probability	you	identified	it	as	green	whether	it	was	actually	green	or	not.		The	percentages	are	explained	as	follows.	The	probability	that	you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green	given	the	cab	was	Green	is	80%	since	this	means	that	you	correctly	identified	the	color.	This	is	then	multiplied	by	the	overall	probability	that	the	cab	is	Green,	which	is	15%,	since	15%	of	the	cabs	in	the	city	are	green.	The	product	of	these	two,	(80%*20%),	is	then	divided	by	the	overall	probability	that	you	identified	the	cab	as	
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green.	This	could	occur	if	the	cab	was	actually	green	or	if	you	made	a	mistake	and	it	was	blue.	Thus,	you	must	calculate	the	probability	you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green	given	it	was	Green	and	multiply	it	by	the	probability	that	the	cab	is	green,	which	you	just	found	was	(80%*15%).	Then	you	must	add	this	to	the	product	of	the	probability	you	identified	the	color	of	the	cab	as	green	given	the	cab	was	blue,	or	20%	since	you	made	a	mistake,	and	the	probability	of	the	cab	being	blue,	or	85%,	since	85%	of	the	cabs	in	the	city	are	blue.	If	you	place	the	percentages	into	the	formula,	then	the	probability	that	the	cab	is	green	given	that	you	identified	the	color	as	green	=	(80%*15%)/[	(80%*15%)	+	(20%*85%)]=41.37931….%	or	about	41%.	These	odds	are	quite	a	bit	less	than	the	80%	you	assumed.53		
Simpson’s	Paradox	Solution	
	 The	mathematics	behind	Simpson’s	Paradox	differs	from	the	solutions	that	have	previously	been	presented.	However,	the	paradox	is	very	prevalent	in	probability	and	statistics	and	incorporates	several	of	the	basic	and	conditional	probability	concepts	that	we	have	discussed.			Simpson’s	paradox	occurs	when	two	variables	behave	differently	when	considered	separately	than	when	they	are	considered	jointly.	In	the	Berkeley	example,	it	appeared	that	the	males	were	admitted	at	a	higher	rate	than	the	females	when	the	whole	population	was	considered.	However,	when	the	admittance	rates	were	observed	for	individual	departments,	the	females	appeared	to	have	higher	admittance	rates	in	certain	departments.		
                                                53	The	Cab	scenario	and	the	data	behind	it	were	adapted	from	the	following	source:	Ibid.21.	
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In	order	to	evaluate	the	data,	researchers	examined	the	six	largest	graduate	departments,	the	number	of	applicants	to	each,	and	the	percentage	of	male	and	female	students	accepted	into	them.	The	chart54	below	demonstrates	these	numbers.	From	this	data,	researchers	were	able	to	discover	an	extraneous	variable	that	accounted	for	the	paradox	in	the	data.	The	female	applicants	disproportionately	applied	to	the	departments	with	lower	overall	admissions	rates,	while	the	male	applicants	disproportionately	applied	to	the	departments	with	higher	admissions	rates.	In	addition,	it	can	be	seen	in	the	chart	how	in	certain	departments,	female	applicants	had	a	higher	admittance	rate	than	the	male	applicants.	This	contradicts	the	idea	that	Berkeley	was	discriminating	against	gender	and	proves	that	trends	as	a	whole	can	differ	from	the	trends	of	their	categorical	parts.	55		
		 Pearl	describes	this	mathematically	through	a	series	of	conditional	probability	inequalities.			
                                                54	P.J.	Bickel,	E.	A.	Hammel,	and	J.	W.	O'connell.	"Sex	Bias	in	Graduate	Admissions:	Data	from	Berkeley."	Science	187,	no.	4175	(1975):	398-404.	doi:10.1126/science.187.4175.398.	55	Brad	Hershbein,	"When	average	isn’t	good	enough:	Simpson’s	paradox	in	education	and	earnings	|	Brookings	Institution,"	Brookings,	July	28,	2016,	,	accessed	2017,	https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2015/07/29/when-average-isnt-good-enough-simpsons-paradox-in-education-and-earnings/.	
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The	inequalities	are	as	follows:		Pr(E|C)	>	Pr(E|	not	C)	Pr(E|C,	F)	<	Pr	(E|	not	C,	F)	Pr(E|C,	not	F)	<	Pr(E|not	C,	not	F)	A	paradox	seems	to	occur	if	we	think	of	this	situation	as	a	cause-effect	scenario.	For	instance,	let	C	represent	taking	a	certain	drug,	E	represent	recovery,	and	F	represent	being	female.	The	first	inequality	suggests	that	the	drug	is	beneficial	to	the	entire	population.	However,	the	bottom	two	inequalities	suggest	that	the	drug	is	harmful	to	both	males,	or	not	F’s,	and	females.	However,	if	we	do	not	consider	C	and	E	to	have	a	cause	and	effect	relationship,	then	the	paradox	disappears.	Instead,	suppose	that	C	represents	an	evidence	for	E,	which	Pearl	states	could	be	due	to	factors	that	cause	both	C	and	E.	In	other	words,	in	our	example,	suppose	that	the	drug	appears	beneficial	to	the	whole	population	because	males,	who	recover	more	quickly	than	females	regardless	of	the	drug,	are	also	more	likely	than	the	females	to	take	the	drug.	In	this	case,	if	a	drug-taking	patient	is	selected	at	random,	then	it	is	more	likely	that	the	patient	is	male	and	thus	more	likely	to	recover.	This	is	consistent	with	all	three	of	the	inequalities	and	therefore	solves	the	paradox	by	eliminating	it.	56	
Expected	Value	Theory	
	
Expected	Value	Theory	Concept	
		 Decision	theory	is	centered	on	how	an	agent,	typically	an	individual,	reasons	through	their	many	different	options	and	eventually	makes	a	decision.	This	decision	may	
                                                56	Judea	Pearl,	"Understanding	Simpson's	Paradox,"	SSRN	Electronic	Journal,	December	2013,	doi:10.2139/ssrn.2343788.	
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be	based	on	a	number	of	different	factors,	including	the	agent’s	beliefs	and	desires.	Among	the	different	subsets	of	decision	theory	is	normative	decision	theory,	which	is	concerned	with	what	criteria	these	beliefs	and	desires	should	satisfy	in	any	generic	circumstances	and	focuses	on	how	to	handle	situations	of	uncertainty.	The	expected	value	theory	is	then	a	form	of	normative	decision	theory	that	explains	that	in	scenarios	where	there	is	uncertainty,	the	agent	should	choose	the	option	with	the	greatest	expected	desirability	or	value.57	The	expected	value	has	now	come	to	be	calculated	by	taking	the	weighted	average	of	all	possible	outcomes	in	a	given	situation,	with	the	weights	being	assigned	by	the	likelihood,	or	probability,	that	any	particular	event	will	occur.	In	other	words,	in	times	of	uncertainty,	the	expected	value	theory	can	be	used	to	find	which	option	may	produce	the	highest	possible	value,	or	the	amount	of	return	or	payoff.58	While	the	theory	may	have	its	limitations,	as	in	the	case	of	risk,	it	may	aide	in	the	understanding	and	solving	of	certain	paradoxes,	such	as	the	Allais	paradox	and	St.	Petersburg	paradox.			Eighteenth	century	mathematicians	Daniel	Bernoulli	and	Gabriel	Cramer	first	discussed	the	idea	behind	expected	utility	theory.	They	argued	that	the	maximization	of	expected	wealth	was	not	enough	to	explain	the	decisions	made	by	reasonable	individuals	faced	with	risky	monetary	options.	After	the	consideration	of	examples	similar	to	the	Allais	paradox,	Bernoulli	and	Cramer	suggested	that	these	risky	monetary	options	be	evaluated	not	by	their	expected	returns	but	by	the	expectations	of	the	utilities	of	their	returns.	Utility	in	this	case	accounts	for	the	amount	of	satisfaction	or	happiness	derived	from	a	particular	
                                                57	Katie	Steele	and	H.	Orri	Stefánsson,	"Decision	Theory,"	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	December	16,	2015,	accessed	2017.	58	Investopedia	Staff,	"Expected	Utility,"	Investopedia,	June	05,	2007,	accessed	2017.	
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good	or	service.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	expected	utility	also	does	not	fully	account	for	how	risk	affects	behavior.	In	addition,	some	have	argued	that	in	the	long	run,	expected	utility	approaches	expected	value.	59	Let	us	consider	the	roles	value	and	utility	play	in	the	following	paradox	solutions.	
Allais	Paradox	Solution		 The	Allais	paradox	occurred	when	you	entered	into	a	casino	and	were	asked	twice	to	pick	between	two	different	gambles.	The	first	gamble,	gamble	A,	gave	you	a	100%	chance	of	winning	$100.	Gamble	B	on	the	other	hand	gave	you	a	10%	chance	of	winning	$500,	an	89%	chance	of	winning	$100,	and	a	1%	chance	of	receiving	nothing.	You	chose	gamble	A	since	it	lacked	risk.	Next,	you	were	given	the	choice	between	gamble	C	and	gamble	D.	Gamble	C	gave	you	an	11%	chance	of	receiving	$100	and	an	89%	chance	of	receiving	nothing.		Gamble	D	gave	you	a	10%	chance	of	receiving	$500	and	a	90%	chance	of	receiving	nothing.60	You	decided	to	go	with	gamble	D.		As	we	will	see	using	expected	value	theory,	gamble	B	and	gamble	D	have	the	highest	expected	payouts,	meaning	they	appear	to	be	what	the	reasonable	person	should	choose	as	they	would	lead	to	the	highest	possible	winnings.	So	why	would	a	person	choose	A	over	B?	Some	may	suggest	that	gamble	A	is	better	since	it	has	no	risk,	while	gamble	B	still	gives	you	a	small	chance	of	receiving	nothing.	However,	if	a	person	were	to	have	made	the	decisions	based	on	risk,	then	they	would	have	chosen	gamble	A	and	gamble	C.	Since	they	chose	D	in	the	second	set	of	gambles,	this	contradicts	this	notion	of	only	choosing	based	on	risk.	So	
                                                59	Peter	C.	Fishburn,	The	Foundations	of	Expected	Utility	(Dordrecht,	Holland:	D.	Reidel	Pub.	Co.,	2010).	60	Ibid.	25.	(Gamble	A,B,C,D	and	the	numbers	behind	them	orginated	from	this	source.)			
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why	is	it	that	we	manage	to	choose	the	first	gamble	incorrectly,	by	expected	value,	and	yet	choose	the	second	correctly?		Let	us	first	evaluate	why	gamble	B	and	gamble	D	are	the	decisions	with	the	highest	expected	payouts.	By	expected	value	theory,	each	gamble	is	equal	to	the	sum	of	the	products	of	the	probability	of	each	outcome	and	the	outcome.	For	gamble	A,	the	only	outcome	is	$100,	which	when	multiplied	by	100%,	its	probability	of	occurring,	is	equal	to	an	expected	payout	of	$100.	Next,	gamble	B	has	an	expected	payout	equal	to	(10%)*($500)+(89%)*($100)+(1%)*($0)=50+89=$139.	Since	$139	is	greater	than	$100,	the	expected	payout	of	gamble	B	is	higher	and	is	the	gamble	the	rational	person	should	choose.	Following	the	first	gamble,	is	the	decision	between	gamble	C	and	gamble	D.	Gamble	C	has	an	expected	payout	equal	to	(11%)*($100)+(89%)*($0)=$11.	Gamble	D	has	an	expected	payout	equal	to	(10%)*($500)+(90%)*($0)=$50.	Gamble	D	thus	has	a	higher	expected	payout	than	gamble	C	since	$50	is	greater	than	$11.	From	these	calculations,	it	is	clear	that	gamble	B	and	gamble	D	have	higher	likelihoods	of	greater	winnings.	After	learning	about	expected	value,	you	now	have	a	tool	to	better	evaluate	which	gambles	may	be	best	not	only	in	a	casino,	but	in	other	real	world	scenarios,	such	as	the	stock	market.		As	for	those	that	still	believe	gamble	A	is	the	better	bet	as	it	lacks	risk,	then	understand	that	the	average	person	subconsciously	places	a	higher	utility	on	the	absence	of	risk	than	it	does	on	reduced	risk;	whether	or	not	this	is	always	rational,	is	up	for	debate.		
St.	Petersburg	Paradox	Solution		 The	St.	Petersburg	paradox	is	another	paradox	that	employs	the	expected	value	theory.	The	paradox	occurs	when	a	person	plays	the	St.	Petersburg	game,	which	involves	flipping	a	coin	until	it	lands	on	heads.	If	the	number	of	flips	that	it	takes	to	get	a	tail	is	equal	
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to	n,	then	n	flips	will	you	give	$2n	worth	of	prizes.	For	instance,	if	you	get	a	tail	on	the	first	flip,	then	you	would	win	$21=$2.	If	you	were	to	get	a	tail	on	the	second	flip,	then	you	would	win	$22=$4	and	so	on.	If	you	were	to	keep	flipping	heads,	then	the	game	could	potentially	continue	seemingly	indefinitely.	This	poses	a	problem	because	if	the	game	could	be	played	an	almost	infinite	number	of	times,	then	the	prizes	could	also	grow	to	be	arbitrarily	large.	Then,	any	entry	fee	into	the	game,	no	matter	how	high,	would	seem	as	though	it	would	be	worth	paying,	as	it	would	always	be	less	than	an	arbitrarily	large	sum	of	prize	money.	However,	it	seems	irrational	to	assume	that	someone	would	be	willing	to	pay	an	exceedingly	high	price	for	such	a	game.	There	must	be	a	cutoff	point,	or	a	point	at	which	the	utility	of	the	game	is	no	longer	increasing.61		Let	us	apply	the	expected	value	theory	to	see	if	we	can	find	how	many	flips	it	would	take	to	reach	the	highest	expected	payoff.	This	should	reveal	when	we	should	stop	playing	the	game.	The	expected	value	theory	dictates	that	we	multiply	the	probability	of	an	event	happening	by	the	prize	that	would	occur	at	that	event.	For	the	first	event,	there	is	a	1	in	2	chance	of	flipping	a	tails,	since	on	a	fair	coin	you	can	role	a	heads	or	a	tails.	The	prize	that	you	would	win	for	flipping	a	tails	on	the	first	try	would	then	be	$2	as	previously	calculated.	So,	the	expected	payoff	would	be	(1/2)*($2)=$1.	The	second	event,	or	flipping	a	tails	on	the	second	try,	is	equal	to	the	probability	of	flipping	a	heads	on	the	first	try	multiplied	by	the	probability	of	flipping	a	tails	on	the	second	try,	or	(1/2)*(1/2)=1/4.	The	prize	is	$4,	so	the	expected	payout	is	(1/4)*($4)=$1.	If	we	continue	this	pattern,	then	we	will	find	that	the	expected	payout	of	every	potential	round	in	the	game	is	$1.	The	expected	value	of	the	game	is	then	the	sum	of	each	of	these	individual	expected	payouts.	If	they	are	each	$1	and	there	
                                                61	Ibid.	28.	
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is	the	potential	for	a	high	number	of	rounds,	then	the	sum	becomes	arbitrarily	large.	Thus,	the	expected	value	theory	further	supports	the	idea	that	playing	the	game,	no	matter	the	entry	fee,	could	lead	to	an	arbitrarily	large	prize.	Therefore,	it	appears	to	be	logical	to	keep	playing.	If	you	cannot	accept	the	idea	that	there	could	be	an	exceedingly	high	entry	fee	worth	paying	due	to	the	possibility	of	a	larger	and	larger	prize,	then	consider	one	of	the	offered	solutions.62	While	there	have	been	many	offered	solutions	to	this	problem,	none	are	perfect.	Consider	however,	as	we	did	with	the	Allais	paradox,	the	concept	of	risk,	and	by	extension,	utility.	There	is	a	point	at	which	the	rational	person	does	not	want	to	risk	any	more	money	on	such	a	game.	Ian	Hacking	in	his	1980	paper	believed	this	point	to	be	at	an	entry	fee	of	$25.	Half	of	the	time	the	game	only	pays	$2	since	there	is	a	50%	chance	of	getting	a	tails	on	the	first	try.	In	addition,	the	probability	of	getting	$4	or	less	can	be	found	if	we	apply	the	complement	rule	and	calculate	1-25%	since	there	is	a	25%	chance	the	second	flip	is	tails,	which	gives	us	75%.	As	the	odds	of	gaining	each	higher	prize	decrease	rapidly,	we	can	see	how	it	seems	riskier	and	riskier	to	invest	more	into	the	game.	Hacking	came	up	with	a	maximum	entry	fee	of	$25,	since	the	odds	of	getting	more	than	$25	is	less	than	1	in	25,	or	less	than	4%.	While	this	is	arbitrary,	it	does	represent	one	possibility	for	a	finite	answer.	However,	one	issue	with	this	is	that	some	may	be	less	risk	averse	than	others.63	In	other	words,	there	may	be	someone	willing	to	buy	into	the	game	even	if	there	is	less	than	a	4%	chance	of	winning.	Regardless,	you	can	either	accept	that	the	game	can	have	an	exceedingly	high	entry	fee	since	the	prize	can	be	arbitrarily	large,	or	you	can	weigh	the	expected	value	
                                                62	Ibid.	63	Ian	Hacking,	"Strange	Expectations,"	Philosophy	of	Science	47,	no.	4	(1980):	doi:10.1086/288956.	
 
 
52 
and	expected	utility	of	playing	the	next	round	and	make	a	decision	for	yourself	on	when	to	stop	playing.	
Newcomb’s	Paradox	Solution	
		 You	may	recall	that	Newcomb’s	paradox	involved	the	picking	of	either	a	box	with	$1,000	in	it	and/or	a	box	with	$1	million	or	nothing	in	it.	The	catch	was	that	if	a	mystical	being	predicted	you	would	choose	both	boxes,	then	it	would	put	nothing	in	the	second	box.	However,	if	it	predicted	you	would	just	take	the	second	box,	then	it	would	place	$1	million	in	the	box.	The	paradox	may	be	set	up	with	Bayes’	Theorem	in	different	ways,	depending	on	which	approach	you	take.			 Let	us	first	consider	the	players	and	the	variables	involved	in	Newcomb’s	paradox.	You	and	the	wise	being,	W	represent	the	players.	The	variables	are	W’s	prediction,	which	we	will	refer	to	as	g,	and	the	choice	you	make,	or	y.	There	are	two	different	versions	of	Bayes’	theorem	that	may	be	interpreted	from	these	variables.			 The	first	approach	has	the	equation	Pr(y,g)=	Pr(g|y)*Pr(y).	It	would	set	up	Bayes’	theorem	to	base	Pr(y,g),	the	probability	of	the	choice	make	and	W’s	prediction,	on	the	Pr(g|y)	and	the	Pr(y),	or	the	probability	of	W’s	prediction	given	the	choice	you	make	and	the	probability	of	the	choice	you	make.	This	approach	assumes	that	W’s	algorithm	for	predictions	is	never	wrong	and	thus	that	W	has	the	power	to	set	the	conditional	probability.	In	other	words,	Pr(g|y)	represents	the	strategy	W	chooses	and	Pr(y)	represents	the	strategy	that	you	choose.	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	strategies	do	not	specify	which	choice	was	made,	but	the	set	of	choices	that	can	be	made.	After	considering	this,	then	the	first	approach	ultimately	tells	you	to	make	the	decision	by	choosing	the	Pr(y)	that	maximizes	the	expected	payoff	under	the	Pr(y,g)	associated	with	that	choice.	So,	if	the	
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first	approach	assumes	there	is	a	100%	chance	that	W	predicts	correctly,	then	there	is	either	an	expected	payoff	with	choosing	both	boxes	of	100%(0+$1000)=	$1000	or	an	expected	payoff	with	choosing	box	B	of	100%($	1	million)=$1	million.	Hence,	the	first	approach’s	conclusion	is	to	choose	only	box	B.			 The	second	approach	has	the	equation	Pr(y,g)=	Pr(y|g)*Pr(g).	It	would	set	up	Bayes’	theorem	to	base	Pr(y,g)	on	the	Pr(y|g)	and	the	Pr(g),	or	the	probability	of	the	choice	you	make	given	W’s	prediction	and	the	probability	of	the	choice	W	makes.	The	second	approach	assumes	that	your	choice	occurs	after	W	has	made	its	prediction	and	you	do	not	know	what	that	prediction	is	at	the	time	of	your	choice.	In	other	words,	W	cannot	impact	your	prediction.	This	means	that	unlike	in	the	first	approach,	W	cannot	affect	the	conditional.	However,	it	does	still	have	its	own	strategy.		Once	again	you	must	choose	your	strategy,	so	you	consider	the	expected	payoffs	under	the	associated	Pr(y,g).	In	this	approach,	choosing	box	B	could	result	in	an	expected	value	equal	to	Pr(g=B)*($1	million)	+	Pr(g=AB)*($0)	or	the	expected	value	that	W	guessed	you	would	choose	box	B	plus	the	expected	value	that	W	guessed	you	would	choose	box	A	and	B.	Thus,	box	B	could	payout	once	again	either	$1	million	or	$0,	no	matter	the	probabilities	for	W	guessing	you	would	only	choose	box	B	and	W	guessing	you	would	choose	both	A	and	B.	However,	the	expected	value	of	choosing	boxes	A	and	B	is	equal	to	Pr(g=b)*($1,001,000)	+	Pr(g=AB)*($1,000).	This	is	because	if	W	was	wrong	and	guessed	you	would	choose	only	box	B,	then	you	would	get	$1,001,000	and	if	W	guessed	you	would	choose	box	A	and	B	you	would	get	$1,000.	No	matter	the	probabilities,	this	will	have	higher	expected	payout	than	just	choosing	box	B	since	$1,001,000	is	always	going	to	be	greater	
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than	$1	million	and	$1,000	is	always	going	to	be	greater	than	$0.	Thus,	the	second	approach’s	conclusion	is	to	choose	boxes	A	and	B.	64		 Whether	you	take	the	first	approach	or	the	second,	it	is	key	to	understand	why	you	want	to	choose	the	box	or	boxes	you	do	and	what	could	cause	you	to	reconsider.		
Regression	To	The	Mean	
		 Regression	to	the	mean	is	based	on	the	probability	model	known	as	the	bivariate	normal	distribution.	A	graph	of	the	normal	distribution	is	shaped	like	a	bell	curve.	The	bivariate	normal	distribution	is	similar	to	this,	but	instead	of	graphing	one	variable,	it	graphs	two	correlated	random	variables,	which	we	will	call	X1	and	X2.	This	kind	of	graph	is	built	on	five	types	of	parameters.	The	first	two	are	the	mean	and	variance	of	X1	where	the	mean	is	the	average	and	the	variance	is	the	measure	of	how	widely	individuals	in	a	group	vary.	The	second	two	are	the	mean	and	variance	of	the	second	variable,	X2,	and	the	final	parameter	is	the	covariance	of	X1	and	X2,	which	is	the	measure	of	how	widely	the	two	variables	vary	from	each	other,	or	rather	the	extent	of	their	association.	Suppose	that	we	consider	the	heights	of	the	fathers	and	sons	that	we	discussed	earlier	and	let	X1	be	the	fathers	whose	heights	are	about	2	inches	above	average.	Then,	we	can	use	the	bivariate	normal	distribution	to	find	the	average	height	that	their	sons	would	be.	The	charts	that	show	this	are	demonstrated	below.	The	first	shows	a	plot	where	the	dots	in	purple	represent	the	father-son	pairs	that	have	a	father	2	inches	above	average.	These	dots	were	then	put	into	the	histogram	shown	in	the	second	chart.	The	histogram	shows	the	conditional	distribution,	or	the	probability	of	the	son’s	height	given	that	the	father	is	two	inches	taller	than	average.	The	normal	distribution,	or	bell	curve	is	then	added	to	the	
                                                64	Ibid.30.	
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histogram	and	appears	to	be	a	good	fit	as	it	shows	that	the	conditional	distribution	is	centered	on	1.	In	other	words,	the	sons	with	fathers	two	inches	taller	than	the	general	population	are	on	average,	1	inch	taller	than	the	general	population.	This	shows	the	regression	to	the	mean	idea	because	the	sons’	heights	are	closer	to	the	general	population	average	than	the	fathers’	heights	are.	This	is	because	height	involves	heredity,	which	involves	some	luck.	Outcomes,	such	as	height	or	performance	in	a	game,	are	impacted	by	a	constant,	or	relatively	constant	component,	such	as	ability	in	the	case	of	professional	athletes	or	genes	in	the	case	of	fathers.	However,	such	events	are	also	impacted	by	a	luck	component.	When	outcomes	are	governed	by	both	a	constant	and	an	element	of	luck,	then	the	odds	are	that	after	one	extreme	outcome,	such	as	a	high	scoring	game	or	tall	father,	there	will	be	an	outcome	closer	to	average.65					
		
	
                                                65	Ibid.38.	
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SECTION	IV:	REAL	WORLD	APPLICATIONS	
Basic	Probability:	Applications	of	the	Birthday	Paradox	There	are	numerous	applications	of	the	birthday	problem	outside	of	determining	the	odds	that	at	least	two	people	in	a	room	share	the	same	birthday.	It	is	particularly	useful	in	situations	where	it	is	helpful	to	know	the	likelihood	that	two	individuals	will	randomly	share	the	same	information.			For	instance,	you	would	not	want	your	information	to	match	or	come	close	to	matching	that	of	a	recent	criminal’s.	Consider	a	case	involving	DNA	evidence,	such	as	the	one	we	discussed	with	the	prosecutor’s	fallacy.	A	crime	was	committed	and	the	DNA	from	the	scene	was	collected.	Assume	there	is	a	1	in	5	million	chance	that	an	innocent	person	would	have	DNA	that	matched	the	sample.	Also,	suppose	there	is	a	database	with	the	genetic	material	of	10	million	people.	An	officer	enters	in	the	newly	collected	evidence	into	the	database	to	see	if	there	is	a	match.	While	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	you	could	pick	a	specific	person	that	would	happen	to	match	the	sample	DNA,	just	as	it	would	be	rare	to	find	someone	with	your	exact	birthday	in	a	room	of	people,	the	odds	are	good	that	there	exists	some	person	in	the	large	database	that	matches	the	sample.	On	average,	the	database	will	likely	come	up	with	two	names	that	match	the	sample,	with	at	least	one	of	them	being	innocent.	In	this	scenario,	the	larger	the	database,	the	higher	the	likelihood	that	more	people	will	match,	as	is	the	case	with	the	odds	of	people	having	the	same	birthday	in	a	room	with	more	people.		While	it	is	discouraging	to	think	that	as	DNA	databases	grow,	more	people	will	match	with	someone	who	committed	a	crime,	there	are	laws	that	dictate	the	quantity	of	genetic	loci	that	must	match	for	the	DNA	evidence	to	be	admitted	in	a	trial.	In	addition,	it	is	
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important	not	to	discount	the	value	of	the	database	even	if	it	does	generate	10	possible	matches	for	one	given	sample.	This	may	narrow	an	investigation	down	to	10	people	and	officers	may	be	able	to	narrow	the	search	down	further	by	determining	which	of	the	10	could	have	been	in	the	area	at	the	time	of	the	crime,	which	knew	the	victim,	and/or	which	could	have	physically	been	able	to	commit	the	crime.	That	being	said,	it	is	imperative	that	judges	and	juries	consider	the	countless	other	factors	in	a	case	aside	from	DNA	evidence	because	if	they	do	not,	they	run	the	danger	of	convicting	an	innocent	person	who	happens	to	match	the	criminal	in	one	aspect.	66	Along	the	same	lines,	the	birthday	problem	may	also	have	applications	in	Class	Phenotype	Probability.	Suppose	you	are	given	six	characteristics,	including	blood	type,	RH	positive/negative,	sex,	mid-digital	hair	positive/negative,	earlobes	attached/unattached,	and	PTC	taste	receptor.	It	is	possible	to	determine	the	probability	that	a	certain	combination	of	these	exists	and	the	odds	that	two	people	share	the	same	combination.	This	is	immensely	valuable	in	the	medical	field	because	finding	phenotype	matches	can	lead	to	finding	matches	between	organ	donors	and	potential	recipients.67			 In	addition,	the	birthday	paradox	has	many	uses	in	computer	science	in	the	areas	of	cryptology	and	cyber	security.	An	aptly	named	“birthday	attack”	occurs	when	a	computationally	intensive	strategy	is	used	to	break	encrypted	signatures.	During	the	attack,	a	“collision”	occurs	when	different	sets	of	data	yield	the	same	cryptographic	hash	value,	where	a	hash	value	occurs	when	an	arbitrarily	large	amount	of	data	is	mapped	to	a	fixed	amount	of	data.	Throughout	an	attack,	a	hash-generating	function	is	repeatedly	
                                                66Jordan	Ellenberg,	"If	Police	Find	a	DNA	“Match,”	That	Doesn’t	Mean	They	Have	the	Right	Suspect,"	Slate	Magazine,	June	05,	2013,	accessed	2017,	67	Lidia	Gonzalez,	"Birthday	Problem."	
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evaluated	using	random	inputs	until	the	output	creates	a	collision	with	the	true	hash	value	it	seeks	to	duplicate.		In	other	words,	when	we	think	of	cryptography,	we	think	of	files	being	encrypted	to	protect	private	information.	To	break	an	encryption,	an	attack	is	initiated.	The	attack	uses	a	tool	called	a	hash-generating	function.	Hash-generating	functions	are	very	complicated,	but	let	us	suppose	for	the	sake	of	example	that	the	function	is	a	sum,	such	as	x+y.	Large	amounts	of	data	can	be	plugged	into	x+y	and	different	data	will	produce	different	results,	such	as	2+3=5,	4+8=12,	etc.	However,	suppose	x+y,	when	different	data	is	inputted	into	it,	keeps	equaling	4.	We	would	say	that	it	collides	at	4.	Then,	this	would	reveal	that	4	is	an	important	hash	value	that	could	be	one	of	a	series	of	important	values	that	could	lead	to	the	correct	set	of	data	to	decrypt	a	file.68		 	In	any	given	situation	where	there	is	a	chance	that	you	or	something	you	have	could	randomly	match	with	someone	else	or	something	that	they	have,	whether	it	is	DNA,	Social	Security	numbers,	cyber	security	passwords	and	encryptions,	medical	characteristics,	lottery	numbers,	etc.,	it	is	helpful	to	know	how	to	determine	the	odds	of	it	happening	and	understand	that	there	is	often	a	much	greater	chance	of	it	happening	than	you	may	think,	particularly	in	large	samples.			
Conditional	Probability	and	Bayes’	Theorem	Applications	
	While	Bayes’	Theorem	plays	a	key	role	in	the	solution	to	many	of	the	paradoxes	that	were	discussed,	it	is	also	applicable	in	numerous	real	world	scenarios.	However,	it	is	often	misinterpreted	or	not	considered,	which	can	be	particularly	detrimental	in	the	field	of	medicine.		
                                                68	Ibid.	
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One	real	world	application	where	you	could	greatly	benefit	from	a	heightened	knowledge	of	Bayes’	theorem	would	be	if	you	decided	to	go	to	the	doctor’s	office	and	get	a	test	to	determine	whether	or	not	you	were	sick.	Suppose	that	the	test	has	a	99%	chance	of	being	accurate.	In	other	words,	99%	of	people	who	test	positive	are	sick	and	99%	of	people	who	test	negative	are	healthy.	In	addition,	suppose	it	is	also	known	that	only	1%	of	people	in	the	country	are	sick	with	this	particular	illness.	If	this	is	true,	then	what	are	the	chances	that	you	are	sick	if	you	test	positive?	The	average	person	might	answer	that	there	is	a	99%	chance	that	you	are	sick	since	that	is	how	reliable	the	test	is.	However,	since	only	1%	of	the	population	has	the	sickness,	this	cannot	be	true.	The	information	given	provides	the	probability	that	you	test	positive	given	that	you	are	sick,	but	you	need	to	know	the	probability	that	you	are	in	fact	sick	given	that	you	tested	positive.		Bayes’	Theorem	states	that	in	order	to	find	the	probability	that	you	are	sick	given	that	you	tested	positive,	you	need	to	first	find	the	probability	of	being	sick	and	testing	positive,	and	then	divide	this	by	the	total	probability	of	testing	positive	whether	you	are	sick	or	healthy.		
Pr	(sick	|	test	positive	)	=		Pr(sickandtestpositive)Pr(testpositive) 	It	is	helpful	to	break	the	question	down	into	smaller	Bayes’	Theorem	equations	and	then	combine	them.	In	order	to	find	the	probability	that	you	are	sick	and	you	test	positive,	you	would	use	Bayes’	rule	and	the	multiplication	rule	and	find	the	product	of	the	probability	that	you	test	positive	given	that	you	are	sick,	which	is	given	to	be	99%,	and	the	probability	that	you	are	sick,	which	is	given	to	be	1%	since	only	1%	of	the	country	is	sick.		Pr(sick	and	test	positive)	=	Pr(test	positive	|	sick)*Pr(sick)	=	(99%)(1%)		
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Then,	you	would	divide	this	product	by	the	overall	probability	that	you	test	positive.	The	probability	that	you	test	positive	on	the	test	is	equal	to	the	probability	that	you	are	sick	and	test	positive	plus	the	probability	that	you	are	healthy	and	test	positive,	since	you	could	be	sick	or	healthy	and	still	test	positive.		Pr(test	positive)	=	Pr(sick	and	test	positive)	+	Pr(healthy	and	test	positive)	The	probability	that	you	are	sick	and	test	positive	you	just	found	above,	so	you	now	need	to	find	the	probability	that	you	are	healthy	and	test	positive.	If	you	apply	Bayes’	Rule	once	again	as	well	as	the	multiplication	rule,	then	the	probability	that	you	are	healthy	and	test	positive	is	equal	to	the	product	of	the	probability	that	you	test	positive	given	that	you	are	healthy,	which	is	given	to	be	1%,	since	there	is	a	1%	chance	the	test	is	unreliable,	and	the	probability	that	you	are	healthy,	which	is	given	to	be	99%,	since	there	is	only	1%	of	the	country	that	is	sick.		Pr(healthy	and	test	positive)	=	Pr(test	positive	|	healthy)*Pr(healthy)=(1%)(99%)	When	the	equations	are	combined,	then	the	probability	that	you	are	sick	given	that	you	test	positive	is	only	50%,	meaning	you	really	only	have	a	50%	chance	of	being	sick	if	you	tested	positive.69	
Pr(sick	|	test	positive	)=		Pr(sickandtestpositive)Pr(testpositive) =	 (0.99)(0.1)(0.99)(0.1)+(0.1)(0.99)=0.50=50%	This	is	a	significant	difference	from	the	99%	chance	of	being	sick	that	you	might	have	previously	thought.	From	this	scenario,	you	can	see	the	importance	of	looking	more	closely	at	the	accuracy	of	the	medical	tests	you	take	and	the	prevalence	of	the	disease	in	
                                                69	"What	is	Bayes's	theorem,	and	how	can	it	be	used	to	assign	probabilities	to	questions	such	as	the	existence	of	God?	What	scientific	value	does	it	have?,"	Scientific	American:	The	Sciences,	November	30,	2006,	accessed	2017.	
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your	area.	While	we	would	like	to	believe	that	medical	professionals	have	the	statistical	knowledge	to	accurately	interpret	our	health	data,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	mistakes	can	be	made	and	how	those	mistakes	can	lead	to	false	diagnoses.			 In	addition	to	medical	applications,	Bayes’	theorem	also	has	many	uses	in	technology	and	data	analytics.	One	task	that	it	helps	to	accomplish	that	we	could,	and	often	do	without	realizing,	benefit	from	daily	is	the	filtering	of	our	spam	emails.	Software	that	employs	Bayes’	theorem	works	by	first	asking	the	user	to	generate	a	database	with	words	and	symbols,	such	as	the	$	sign,	certain	IP	addresses	and	domains,	etc.,	that	may	be	assembled	from	a	sample	of	spam	mail	and	legitimate	mail,	which	is	referred	to	as	ham	mail.	The	software	will	also	likely	include	its	own	database	of	frequently	occurring	words	and	symbols.	Once	the	user’s	personalized	database	has	been	created,	then	the	software	will	assign	probability	values	to	each	word	or	symbol	based	on	how	often	these	words	and	symbols	occur	in	spam	mail	compared	to	ham	mail.	For	instance,	suppose	the	word	“mortgage”	appears	in	400	out	of	3,000	spam	emails	and	5	out	of	300	ham	emails.	The	software	would	then	assign	a	probability	value	to	the	word	by	calculating	the	Bayes’	Theorem.	The	probability	that	an	email	is	spam	given	that	it	contains	the	word	“mortgage”	is	equal	to	the	probability	that	an	email	is	spam	and	has	the	word	“mortgage”	in	it	divided	
by	the	probability	that	an	email	contains	the	word	“mortgage.”	This	is	equal	to		
40030004003000 + 5300 ,	which	is	approximately	0.8889.	Once	the	probability	values	of	many	words	and	symbols	have	been	calculated,	software	can	evaluate	a	new	incoming	email.	First,	it	will	compile	the	probability	values	of	the	key	words	in	the	email,	and	then	it	will	assign	the	email	with	an	
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overall	probability	of	being	spam.	If	this	probability	is	over	a	certain	amount,	such	as	0.9,	then	it	is	designated	as	spam	mail	and	is	filtered.	While	there	are	some	errors	to	the	system,	the	Bayesian	approach	tends	to	have	a	high	success	rate.	In	addition,	it	is	favored	due	to	its	ability	to	take	an	entire	message	into	account	and	because	of	its	way	of	self-adapting	by	adding	more	key	words	and	symbols	to	its	database.70			 Whether	Bayes’	theorem	guides	you	in	the	important	task	of	interpreting	your	medical	results	or	saves	you	a	bit	of	time	sifting	through	your	inbox,	it	is	a	valuable	mathematical	concept	with	vast	real-world	implications.	
Expected	Value	Theory	Applications	Perhaps	the	most	common	application	of	expected	value	theory,	which	in	some	cases	is	controversial,	occurs	in	the	stock	market.	While	it	may	be	impossible	to	perfectly	predict	how	stocks	and	the	market	itself	will	behave,	expected	value	theory	provides	a	way	to	quantitatively	value	one	stock	or	portfolio	over	another.	These	values	assigned	to	stocks	are	referred	to	as	expected	returns.	The	expected	return	is	the	amount	of	profit	or	loss	an	investor	anticipates	on	an	investment	that	has	various	known	or	expected	rates	of	return.	In	other	words,	it	is	nothing	more	than	the	investment’s	expected	value.	The	reason	this	is	controversial	is	because	when	you	consider	the	expected	value	formula,	you	must	have	the	quantitative	value	of	the	outcomes	and	the	probability	of	those	outcomes	occurring.	In	the	stock	market,	both	the	outcomes	and	the	probabilities	can	be	unpredictable,	since	no	one	knows	for	sure,	except	in	certain	cases,	what	the	dividends,	or	outcomes	will	be,	or	what	the	chances	of	those	particular	dividends	being	produced	are.	Much	of	this	information	is	
                                                70	“Why	Bayesian	Filtering	Is	the	Most	Effective	Anti-spam	Technology,”	2011,	Rep.	GFI	Software,	accessed	2017.	
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based	on	historical	data,	which	is	not	always	guaranteed	to	be	the	same	or	even	similar	to	what	today’s	data	will	be.	Another	reason	this	method	remains	controversial	is	that	it	does	not	take	into	account	the	full	extent	of	risk.	While	it	weighs	probabilities,	if	an	expected	return	is	high,	but	has	a	very	small	chance	of	occurring,	then	it	may	not	be	the	safest	investment.	Even	despite	these	shortcomings,	expected	returns	are	frequently	quoted	and	compared	among	investors	considering	buying	and	selling	different	stocks.71			 In	addition	to	helping	value	stocks,	expected	returns	are	also	helpful	in	valuing	portfolios	when	the	expected	returns	of	the	stocks	comprising	the	portfolio	are	known.	For	instance,	consider	you	have	a	portfolio	composed	of	stocks	A,	B,	and	C.	Suppose	you	invested	$500,000	in	stock	A	with	an	expected	return	of	15%,	$200,000	in	stock	B	with	an	expected	return	of	6%,	and	$300,000	in	stock	C	with	an	expected	return	of	9%.	Then	just	as	expected	value	is	calculated,	the	outcomes	are	weighed	by	their	probabilities	and	then	summed.	The	only	difference	is	that	the	investment	amounts	are	converted	to	percentages	so	that	the	total	portfolio’s	expected	return	is	a	percentage.	In	other	words,	$500,000	is	equal	to	50%	of	$1,000,000,	or	the	total	value	invested.	$200,000	is	then	equal	to	20%	and	$300,000	is	equal	to	30%.	Thus,	the	equation	becomes	(50%*15%)+(20%*6%)+(30%*9%)=7.5%+1.2%+2.7%=11.4%.	72This	percentage	can	then	be	used	to	determine	how	this	portfolio	stacks	up	against	others	and	how	its	returns	compare	to	an	investor’s	desired	returns.	As	long	as	the	assumptions	made	about	the	returns	as	well	as	the	component	of	risk	are	considered,	the	expected	returns	may	be	
                                                71	Investopedia	Staff,	"Expected	Return,"	Investopedia,	April	17,	2015,	accessed	2017.	72	The	data	from	this	example	comes	from	the	following	source:	Ibid.		
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incredibly	valuable	to	the	wise	investor.	This	is	why	it	is	important	to	know	what	goes	into	calculating	them	and	the	expected	value	theory	behind	doing	so.			 Since	we	discussed	expected	utility	in	addition	to	expected	value,	let	us	consider	an	expected	utility	application.	One	such	application	of	the	expected	utility	theory	is	in	the	study	of	climate	change.	Matthew	Kahn	and	Daxuan	Zhao	published	a	paper	in	February	of	2017	on	how	the	prevalence	of	so-called	“climate	skeptics”	has	led	to	reduced	demand	and	support	for	products,	services,	and	legislation	that	aide	in	climate	adaptation.	With	a	lack	of	demand	from	consumers	for	climate-resilient	products,	companies	are	less	likely	to	focus	on	dedicating	their	resources	to	solving	challenges	in	this	field.	Both	professors	argue	that	the	“market	potential”	for	climate	adaptation	is	key	because	capitalism	could	incentivize	necessary	climate	change	innovations.	These	innovations	they	claim	need	to	come	in	the	way	of	more	efficient	air	conditioning	to	protect	us	from	climate	change-induced	heat,	as	well	as	in	the	way	of	architecture	to	reduce	the	flood	damage	to	real	estate.	Their	model	on	this	is	based	on	expected	utility.		They	claim	that	each	person	in	the	economy	wants	to	maximize	their	expected	utility,	which	in	the	model	was	calculated	by	multiplying	the	value	of	a	person’s	future	consumption	by	their	chance	of	survival.	In	other	words,	they	used	expected	utility	to	find	the	value	of	a	person	enjoying	their	life	multiplied	by	the	chance	that	they	will	live	to	enjoy	it.	This	is	connected	to	climate	change	because	products	aimed	at	climate	change	adaptation	may	impact	an	individual’s	survival	rate.	The	model	is	designed	to	show	that	a	rational	person	would	demand	these	types	of	products	in	an	effort	to	increase	their	chances	of	surviving	and	enjoying	future	consumption.	However,	around	50%	of	people	in	the	United	States	are	skeptical	of	human	activity’s	contribution	to	climate	change.	These	
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skeptics	also	aim	to	maximize	their	future	utility,	but	do	not	believe	that	climate-adaptation	products	will	alter	their	chances	of	survival	and	as	a	result,	have	no	reason	to	buy	such	products.	The	model	demonstrates	that	more	skeptics	result	in	less	demand	and	a	smaller	available	market	for	these	products.	A	smaller	available	market	then	results	in	fewer	innovations	in	climate	adaptation	and	fewer	entrepreneurs	willing	to	dedicate	their	careers	such	innovations.73		Expected	value	theory	and	expected	utility	theory,	along	with	being	useful	in	the	financial	and	scientific	realms,	may	be	useful	in	considering	any	decision	with	a	series	of	choices.	The	math	behind	both	may	provide	a	way	to	more	clearly	define	what	the	choices	are	and	how	they	compare	to	one	another.	Even	something	as	simple	as	a	decision	on	whether	to	take	the	bus	could	be	more	thoughtfully	considered	through	the	use	of	both	theories.	While	neither	includes	everything	that	should	be	considered	in	a	decision,	such	as	risk,	the	appropriate	calculation	of	expected	value	or	expected	utility	could	lead	you	to	make	more	prudent	decisions.		
Regression	To	The	Mean	Applications	As	we	have	discussed,	the	regression	to	the	mean	phenomenon	occurs	when	an	extreme	outcome	is	followed	by	a	more	average	outcome	and	where	the	outcomes	are	governed,	at	least	in	part,	by	chance.	There	are	many	different	real	world	applications	for	this.	We	have	considered	its	occurrence	in	heredity,	which	is	how	it	was	first	discovered,	but	we	also	discussed	its	relevance	in	a	sports	setting.	Major	league	baseball	players	that	have	the	highest	batting	averages	in	the	first	season	are	more	likely	to	bat	closer	to	the	league’s	average	in	their	second	season,	which	many	mistake	for	a	slump.	Along	with	
                                                73	Matthew	E.	Kahn	and	Daxuan	Zhao,	"The	More	Climate	Skeptics	There	Are,	the	Fewer	Climate	Entrepreneurs,"	Harvard	Business	Review,	March	16,	2017,	accessed	2017.	
 
 
66 
heredity,	the	sophomore	slump	and	the	Sports	Illustrated	curse,	regression	to	the	mean	also	appears	in	the	medical	field.			 Consider	the	many	different	measurements	that	a	Doctor	takes	during	a	routine	check-up.	They	are	likely,	at	minimum,	to	take	down	your	weight,	cholesterol,	and	blood	pressure.	If	one	of	these	is	in	one	of	the	extremes,	either	too	high	or	too	low,	then	it	may	be	an	indicator	of	an	underlying	disease	or	be	a	risk	factor	of	a	disease.	For	this	reason,	people	with	high	blood	pressure	for	example,	will	be	treated	with	medication	designed	to	lower	the	value	closer	to	the	average.	However,	if	these	same	people	come	in	and	get	measured	again,	then	it	is	likely	that	their	values	will	be	closer	to	the	general	population’s	average.	This,	however,	does	not	indicate	that	the	medication	they	were	given	was	effective.	Even	if	these	people	remained	untreated,	it	is	more	than	likely	that	their	blood	pressure	would	fall	closer	to	the	general	population’s	average	because	of	regression	to	the	mean.	Therefore,	we	must	be	careful	considering	a	medication’s	true	effectiveness	and	make	sure	to	account	for	extreme	values	naturally	becoming	closer	to	average	values.	74,2		 The	regression	to	the	mean	may	also	come	up	in	publication	bias.	Rousseeuw	explains	that	referees	who	determine	which	papers	are	submitted	for	publication	do	not	always	agree	which	papers	should	be	accepted.75	Because	this	then	means	that	referees’	judgments	are	made	with	error,	then	the	quality	of	the	paper	cannot	be	perfectly	correlated	with	the	referees’	judgments.	Therefore,	when	the	referees	pass	the	chosen	papers,	which	are	supposedly	the	best,	to	the	editor	for	publication,	then	the	average	quality	of	the	paper	
                                                74	J.	M.	Bland	and	D.	G.	Altman,	"Statistics	Notes:	Some	examples	of	regression	towards	the	mean,"	Bmj	309,	no.	6957	(1994):	,	doi:10.1136/bmj.309.6957.780.	2	C.	E.	Davis,	"The	Effect	Of	Regression	To	The	Mean	In	Epidemiologic	And	Clinical	Studies,"	
American	Journal	of	Epidemiology	104,	no.	5	(1976):	doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a112321.	3	PJ	Rousseeuw	,	"Why	the	wrong	papers	get	published,"	Chance,	1991.	
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will	be	less	than	the	editor	thinks.	In	addition,	the	average	quality	of	the	rejected	papers	will	be	higher	than	the	editor	thinks.	Thus,	if	you	find	that	one	of	your	papers	was	rejected,	then	you	may	not	need	to	feel	too	upset.	You	could	have	just	been	a	victim	to	the	regression	of	the	mean.			 Regression	to	the	mean	can	also	occur	in	our	interactions	with	other	people.	Consider	the	story	of	the	small	private	college	in	the	US	that	conducted	an	elaborate	nationwide	search	for	a	new	dean.	The	college	first	considered	its	internal	candidates,	but	none	of	them	were	seen	as	a	good	fit.	The	search	committee	then	sifted	through	hundreds	of	external	applicants’	résumés	and	references	and	identified	several	candidates	that	they	felt	were	worth	an	interview.	The	committee	then	interviewed	these	candidates	at	neutral	airports	before	settling	on	three	to	bring	to	campus.	Once	on	campus,	the	three	candidates	were	each	subjected	to	two	days	of	meetings	with	the	faculty,	administration,	and	students.	While	the	search	committee	was	initially	enthusiastic	about	their	final	three,	the	candidates	each	visited	the	campus	with	limited	success.	The	committee	and	those	who	had	participated	in	the	interview	process	were	instead	disappointed.	This	occurred	because	although	the	three	candidates	appeared	to	be	the	best,	they	were	almost	surely	not	as	good	as	they	seemed	to	be.	They	were	likely	closer	to	average.	This	also	explains	why	internal	candidates	are	often	at	a	disadvantage	when	upper-level	positions	are	vacant.	Internal	candidates	are	a	familiar	commodity	and	so	their	abilities	and	their	flaws	are	already	known	unlike	their	external	counterparts.		Unfortunately,	Smith	says	this	same	idea	is	true	in	our	search	for	soul	mates.	While	everyone	looks	for	different	things,	let	us	assume	that	“pizzazz”	encompasses	them	all.	Of	the	many	dozens,	or	hundreds,	or	thousands	of	people	that	we	may	meet,	only	a	few	will	
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stand	out.	From	these	few,	we	may	recognize	signs	of	the	so-called	“pizzazz.”	After	doing	so,	we	may	then	gather	the	courage	to	get	to	know	a	portion	of	the	few.	However,	when	we	do,	Smith	says	that	we	will	likely	be	disappointed.	They	will	not	be	as	good	as	we	thought	they	were,	but	more	average.	Smith	offers	that	the	bad	news	is	that	this	is	what	we	should	come	to	expect,	but	that	the	good	news	is	that	we	can	keep	looking.	I	prefer	to	consider	the	opposite,	perhaps	those	we	dismiss	firsthand	as	not	having	the	“pizzazz”	may	be	better	than	we	think.	Smith	also	makes	the	point	that	the	other	person	probably	feels	the	same	way	about	us.76	The	regression	to	the	mean	may	also	be	an	issue	that	impacts	safety	studies.	Speeding	is	something	many	of	us	may	be	guilty	of,	but	how	much	does	a	traffic	camera	impact	our	behavior?	Several	studies	have	been	completed	to	show	the	effectiveness	of	engineering	equipment	on	reducing	speeding	individuals.	However,	Park	and	Lord	suggest	that	it	is	not	necessarily	the	speed	equipment	that	has	led	to	fewer	violations.	It	may	instead	be	that	extreme	outcomes,	which	were	not	normal	for	an	area,	were	occurring	before	the	equipment	was	installed.	In	other	words,	people	were	speeding	in	a	certain	area	more	than	they	normally	would.	This	ceased	once	the	equipment	was	put	into	place,	so	those	studying	it	believed	that	the	equipment	caused	the	speeding	to	decrease.	However,	it	is	likely	that	speeding	was	occurring	at	higher	than	normal	rates	for	the	area	before	the	equipment	was	installed,	which	skewed	the	results.	Park	and	Lord	concluded	that	in	order	
                                                76	Gary	Smith,	"What	does	regression	to	the	mean,	mean?,"	ABC	-	Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation,	May	12,	2015,	accessed	2017,	
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to	test	the	effectiveness	of	such	equipment,	more	rigorous	statistical	methods	that	would	take	into	account	regression	to	the	mean	should	be	used.77																				
                                                77	Peter	Park	and	Dominique	Lord,	"Investigating	Regression	to	the	Mean	in	Before-and-After	Speed	Data	Analysis,"	Transportation	Research	Record:	Journal	of	the	
Transportation	Research	Board	2165	(2010):	,	doi:10.3141/2165-06.	
 
 
70 
SECTION	V:	CONCLUSION	Paradoxes	and	fallacies	represent	occasions	where	our	logic	has	failed	us.	Whether	we	are	trapped	between	two	conflicting	answers	or	lost	in	an	error,	something	has	gone	wrong.	However,	this	failure	is	often	not	a	bad	thing.	The	book,	The	5	Elements	of	Effective	
Thinking,	even	claims	seemingly	paradoxically	that	failing	is	one	of	the	five	keys	to	our	success.	In	order	to	fail	productively,	we	must	first	try	something,	then	recognize	and	assess	our	errors,	and	then	make	an	improved	attempt.	Eventually,	a	steady	stream	of	improved	attempts	can	lead	to	a	discovery	or	an	innovation,	as	in	the	case	of	Thomas	Edison	and	the	invention	of	the	light	bulb.78	On	a	small	scale,	this	thesis	serves	as	an	example	of	this	process.	In	one	sense,	the	writing	of	this	thesis	represents	productive	failure.	Numerous	drafts	were	written,	and	after	each,	more	errors	in	content	and	grammar	were	recognized	and	corrected.	From	these	corrections,	came	improved	attempts.	Ideally,	this	attempt	is	a	success	because	it	represents	the	most	improved	of	the	attempts	and	is	one	step	closer	to	reaching	its	goal	of	bettering	its	readers’	decisions.		In	addition,	the	content	of	this	thesis	goes	through	the	steps	of	productive	failure.	In	the	beginning,	through	the	discussion	of	paradoxes	and	fallacies,	this	thesis	seeks	to	explain	common	failures	in	logic,	and	why	and	when	they	occur	in	the	hopes	that	readers	may	more	easily	recognize	them	in	the	future.	Then,	the	thesis	moves	on	to	discuss	how	these	errors	might	be	resolved	through	the	use	of	a	few	key	mathematical	tools.	These	tools	were	
                                                78	Edward	B.	Burger	and	Michael	Starbird,	The	5	elements	of	effective	thinking	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2012).			
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designed	to	give	the	reader	the	ability	to	make	improved	attempts	when	they	are	confronted	with	paradoxes	and	fallacies	in	their	own	lives.	Steadily,	these	improved	attempts	could	lead	to	more	productive	failures	in	decision-making,	and	hopefully,	to	the	innovation	of	a	new	thought	or	new	solution.		Among	those	likely	to	be	faced	with	many	new	incoming	obstacles	and	opportunities	to	fail,	are	recent	graduates	entering	the	labor	force.	By	incorporating	paradoxes	and	fallacies	and	the	mathematics	behind	them	into	the	degrees	of	mathematics	and	hard	sciences	students,	as	well	as	liberal	arts	and	humanities	students,	colleges	and	universities	could	provide	all	of	their	graduates	with	a	valuable	education	that	combines	the	knowledge	of	a	certain	field	or	fields,	with	the	ability	to	tackle	failure.	With	this	power,	graduates	will	be	more	prepared	to	fail	their	way	to	success	and	innovation	in	the	real	world.	If	what	starts	here	changes	the	world,	let	us	consider	making	this	addition	to	our	curriculum	at	the	University	of	Texas.			“That’s	All	Folks!”	
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